Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The National Association of Government Employees, Inc. (NAGE) challenged the constitutionality of the Debt Limit Statute, alleging that it posed an imminent risk to its members, who are federal employees. NAGE claimed that if the debt limit was not raised, its members would face layoffs, furloughs, unpaid work, and loss of pension funding. NAGE sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and President Joseph R. Biden.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that NAGE's claims of past injuries were moot due to the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which suspended the debt limit until January 1, 2025, and required the Treasury Secretary to make whole the G Fund accounts. The court also determined that NAGE's claims of future harm were too speculative to establish standing, as they relied on a series of unlikely events, including a federal default, which has never occurred.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that NAGE lacked standing to pursue prospective relief because the anticipated future harms were speculative and not certainly impending. The court also found that NAGE's claims of past injuries were moot, as the Fiscal Responsibility Act had addressed the immediate concerns, and there was no reasonable expectation that the same harm would recur. The court rejected NAGE's arguments that the voluntary-cessation and capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exceptions to mootness applied, concluding that the legislative action was independent and not related to the litigation, and that the risk of future harm was not reasonably expected. View "National Association of Government Employees, Inc. v. Yellen" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was convicted by a jury in New Hampshire state court for the first-degree murder of Larry Lemieux. The petitioner admitted to shooting Lemieux but claimed he acted in self-defense or in defense of another, arguing he did not act with premeditation. After his conviction, the prosecution disclosed a proffer letter recommending a suspended sentence for drug charges against Jose Gomez, a key prosecution witness. The petitioner argued that the failure to disclose this letter violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland.The state trial court denied the petitioner's motion for a new trial, finding that the nondisclosure of the proffer letter did not prejudice the petitioner. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that the petitioner was not prejudiced under New Hampshire law, which sets stricter standards than Brady. The court found that the undisclosed evidence would not have altered the defense strategy or the trial's outcome, given the overwhelming additional evidence of premeditation presented by other witnesses.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The First Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief, concluding that the New Hampshire Supreme Court reasonably determined that the petitioner was not prejudiced by the nondisclosure of the proffer letter. The court noted the overwhelming evidence of premeditation from multiple witnesses, which supported the jury's verdict independent of Gomez's testimony. View "Etienne v. Edmark" on Justia Law

The case involves James Harper, who challenged an IRS "John Doe" summons issued to Coinbase, a cryptocurrency exchange, seeking records of numerous customers, including Harper. Harper argued that the IRS's actions violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights and did not meet statutory requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The IRS had issued the summons to investigate potential tax noncompliance among Coinbase users.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire dismissed Harper's complaint. The court found that Harper lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his Coinbase account information and that the records were Coinbase's property, not Harper's. The court also concluded that the IRS summons was reasonable and that Harper had received constitutionally adequate process. Additionally, the court dismissed Harper's statutory challenge, ruling it was an improper collateral attack on prior district court proceedings that had enforced the summons and found it met statutory standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Harper lacked a protectable interest under the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. It held that Harper had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information he voluntarily provided to Coinbase and that the records were Coinbase's property. The court also found that Harper's due process claim failed because he had no protected liberty interest in the confidentiality of his financial information. Finally, the court ruled that the IRS summons was not "final agency action" under the APA, thus not subject to judicial review.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Harper's complaint, concluding that Harper's constitutional and statutory claims were without merit. View "Harper v. Werfel" on Justia Law

Joseph Segrain, an inmate at Rhode Island's Adult Correctional Institutions, filed a civil lawsuit against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections and several correctional officers, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and various state laws. Segrain claimed that on June 28, 2018, officers used excessive force by executing a leg-sweep maneuver, spraying him with pepper spray, and delaying his decontamination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on all claims, leading Segrain to appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island initially reviewed the case. The court found that no reasonable jury could conclude that the officers' conduct constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. It granted summary judgment on the basis that the force used was minimal and necessary to maintain order. The court also dismissed the state law claims, concluding that the officers' actions did not meet the legal standards for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or excessive force under Rhode Island law.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that Officer Walter Duffy's use of pepper spray violated Segrain's Eighth Amendment rights. It found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Duffy's use of pepper spray was excessive and not in good faith. The court vacated the district court's judgment on the Rhode Island Constitution Article I, Section 8 claim regarding Duffy's use of pepper spray and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on all other claims, including the leg-sweep maneuver and the delayed decontamination, granting qualified immunity to the officers on those issues. View "Segrain v. Duffy" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, a state prisoner, challenged the dismissal of his federal habeas petition, which alleged violations of his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The petitioner, along with two accomplices, planned and executed a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pizza delivery driver. The petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and breaking and entering, and was sentenced to life in prison without parole.The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the petitioner's conviction, rejecting his claims of insufficient evidence, improper admission of redacted statements from a co-defendant, and errors in jury instructions. The SJC found that the evidence was sufficient to support the petitioner's conviction under theories of felony-murder and extreme atrocity or cruelty. It also held that the redacted statements did not violate the petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights and that the trial court's jury instructions were appropriate.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the habeas petition de novo. The court applied the standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which requires deference to state court decisions unless they are contrary to or involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or are based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the SJC's rulings were not unreasonable. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the petitioner's conviction, the redacted statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause, and the jury instructions were proper. The court also concluded that any errors in the trial court's rulings were harmless and did not prejudice the petitioner. View "St. Jean v. Marchilli" on Justia Law

The appellants, Meredith O'Neil, Jessica Svedine, Deanna Corby, and Roberto Silva, sued various officials from the Canton Police Department and the Town of Canton, Massachusetts, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of Massachusetts witness intimidation statutes, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268 §§ 13A and 13B. They claimed that these statutes violated their First Amendment rights, fearing prosecution for their actions during a November 5, 2023 protest and alleging that their speech would be chilled for a planned protest on November 12, 2023. The appellants moved for emergency relief to enjoin the enforcement of these statutes.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the emergency motion on November 10, 2023. The court assumed the plaintiffs had standing but found they did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court held that the statutes served compelling interests in protecting the administration of justice and were narrowly tailored. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown they faced a risk of irreparable harm, noting that the plaintiffs had other public forums to express their views. The balance of harms and public interest considerations also weighed against granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal as moot. The court noted that the state court had dismissed the charges against the appellants for lack of probable cause, and no ongoing conduct remained for the court to enjoin. The court also found that the appellants' general allegations of future protests did not show a credible threat of prosecution, failing to establish standing for their pre-enforcement challenges. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings as appropriate. View "O'Neil v. Canton Police Department" on Justia Law

Federal agents executed a search warrant at Corey Donovan's rural property in New Hampshire, discovering a shotgun, ammunition, and modified oil filters suspected to be homemade silencers. Donovan, a convicted felon, was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. His girlfriend, Kelley Finnigan, claimed ownership of the shotgun but invoked her Fifth Amendment right when called to testify.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire denied Donovan's motion to grant Finnigan immunity and allowed her to invoke a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege. The court also permitted the introduction of evidence related to Donovan's prior arrest and possession of non-firearm weapons, offering to provide limiting instructions if requested during the trial. Donovan did not object to the lack of contemporaneous limiting instructions or the final jury instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Donovan's appeal, which challenged the district court's decisions on Finnigan's Fifth Amendment invocation, the lack of limiting instructions, and the application of a sentencing enhancement for the modified oil filters. The appellate court found no clear or obvious error in allowing Finnigan to invoke her Fifth Amendment right, as her testimony could reasonably incriminate her. The court also determined that Donovan waived his right to challenge the lack of limiting instructions by failing to object during the trial.Regarding the sentencing enhancement, the appellate court upheld the district court's finding that the modified oil filters qualified as homemade silencers under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25). The court affirmed Donovan's conviction and sentence, concluding that the evidence supported the application of the sentencing enhancement. View "US v. Donovan" on Justia Law

Jaden Brown, a pregnant inmate at Cumberland County Jail, was transported to Maine Medical Center for childbirth. During her hospital stay, correction officers Daniel Haskell and Sam Dickey were present in her room. Brown alleged that Haskell and Dickey observed her naked body during medical procedures and the delivery of her baby, which she claimed violated her Fourth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied Haskell and Dickey's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the officers' observations of Brown's naked body were more than inadvertent, occasional, casual, or restricted. The court also ruled that such observations, if they occurred, would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the appeal in part, stating it lacked jurisdiction to consider the officers' argument that they did not observe Brown's naked body, as this was a factual dispute. The court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment, holding that if the officers did observe Brown's naked body, it would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. The court emphasized that a search does not require deliberate intent to inspect a naked body and that such observations could violate clearly established law. View "Brown v. Dickey" on Justia Law

Xiomara Santiago was hired as the Deputy Director for the Head Start Program in Utuado, Puerto Rico. Following a mayoral election, the new mayor, Jorge Pérez, terminated her employment. Santiago claimed her dismissal violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and was politically motivated, violating her First Amendment rights. She sought a preliminary injunction to be reinstated.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held hearings and ultimately denied Santiago's request for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that Santiago had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of either her due process or political discrimination claims. The magistrate judge's Report & Recommendation, which the district judge adopted, found that Santiago's initial hire was contrary to Puerto Rico law, meaning she did not have a property interest in her employment. Additionally, the court found insufficient evidence to support her claim of political discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that Santiago had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her claims. The court noted that Santiago's argument regarding the incorrect application of Puerto Rico law was waived because it was raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the court found no clear error in the district court's assessment that Santiago's political affiliation was not a substantial factor in her termination. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "Santiago v. Municipality of Utuado" on Justia Law

In October 1, 2021, Sean J. Trahan pleaded guilty to possession and knowing access with intent to view child pornography, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The district court sentenced him to 126 months' imprisonment, applying a sentencing enhancement based on Trahan's prior state conviction for possession of "visual material of child depicted in sexual conduct," which the court determined required a ten-year mandatory minimum under § 2252A(b)(2).The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially reviewed the case. Trahan objected to the imposition of the mandatory minimum, arguing that his prior state conviction did not qualify under § 2252A(b)(2) because the state statute criminalized more conduct than the federal statute. He also challenged the imposition of a consecutive six-month sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 for an offense committed while on pretrial release, arguing it violated the Sixth Amendment. The district court rejected these arguments and sentenced Trahan to 126 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the phrase "relating to" in § 2252A(b)(2) has a broadening effect, meaning that a state conviction need not be an exact match with the federal definition of child pornography to trigger the mandatory minimum. The court found that Trahan's prior state conviction was sufficiently related to the federal definition to warrant the enhancement. Additionally, the court rejected Trahan's Alleyne challenge, concluding that any error in imposing the consecutive sentence under § 3147 was harmless because there was overwhelming evidence that Trahan committed the offense while on pretrial release. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's 126-month sentence. View "United States v. Trahan" on Justia Law