Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was sentenced to death after being convicted of the first degree murders of three victims and the attempted premeditated murders of two other victims. Defendant's appeal was automatic and the court addressed issues related to the guilt phase and the penalty phase of trial. The court held that the $10,000 restitution fine was stricken and the amounts awarded to the victim/witness compensation program were stricken. The restitution orders were modified to award Alice Arnold $3,440.67 in victim restitution and to award the victim/witness compensation program $8,678.73 in victim restitution. As so modified, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. At issue was when a trial court denied a defendant's motion for a physical lineup and the defendant did not seek review of that ruling, was the defendant barred from the issue on postjudgment appeal. The court of appeal said yes, reasoning that a failure to challenge the ruling by writ undermined the purpose of the lineup right conferred under Evans v. Superior Court. In the alternative, the court of appeals assumed the issue was preserved and that the trial court erred, but that any error was harmless. The court held that the court of appeal erred in holding that defendant forfeited his right to appeal the denial of his lineup motion by failing to pursue writ relief. However, that court correctly concluded that the trial court's error, if any, was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder of his elderly neighbor and the jury found true the three special circumstance allegations that the murder took place during the commission of rape, sodomy, and burglary. Defendant was additionally convicted of arson and the jury found true various sentencing enhancements. Defendant was sentenced to death and this appeal was automatic. The court affirmed the judgment in its entirety. With respect to the abstract of judgment, however, the court ordered that it be corrected to conform to the trial court's oral judgment pronounced as to count II (arson) of an indeterminate term of 25 years of life, with an additional determinate term of five years.

Defendant lived and sold drugs in Madera County; possessed a key and a receipt for a storage locker that was located in neighboring Fresno County; the storage locker contained drugs and a firearm. The Court of Appeal ruled that the drugs and firearm located in Fresno County did not provide a basis for prosecuting defendant in Madera County for possession for sale of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The court disagreed and concluded that Madera County was a proper venue in which to prosecute defendant because defendant committed preparatory acts in Madera County and because the effects of defendant's unlawful possession of the drugs and firearm found in the Fresno storage locker would be felt in Madera County.

Defendant was convicted of seven felony sex offenses related to the molesting of his two stepdaughters, including one count of oral copulation of Jane Doe 1 in violation of Penal Code 288.7. Defendant claimed on appeal, among other things, that his section 288.7(b) conviction must be reversed and the count dismissed because Jane Doe 1 - who was 10 years and approximately 11 months old at the time of the molestation - was not "10 years of age or younger" within the meaning of section 288.7. The court concluded that the interpretation of the statutory phrase "10 years of age or younger" included children younger than 10 years of age and children who have reached their 10th birthday but who have not yet reached their 11th birthday. That is, "10 years of age or younger" as expressed by the Legislature in section 288.7 was another means of saying "under 11 years of age." Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent it concluded defendant was improperly convicted of violating section 288.7(b) with respect to Jane Doe 1.

Defendant and co-defendant were convicted of murder and the jury found true the special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed while defendant and co-defendant were engaged in the commission of a robbery. The jury also convicted defendant of the second degree robbery of two other victims and unlawful possession of a firearm. In connection with the murder and robbery counts, the jury found true allegations that defendant personally used a handgun. In a separate, subsequent proceeding, the same jury convicted defendant of the first degree murder of Harry "Ricky" Byrd, and found true the special circumstance allegation that defendant had been convicted of more than one murder and the allegation that defendant personally used a handgun in the murder. Defendant was sentenced to death and this appeal was automatic. The court ordered that the abstract of judgment be corrected to conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement that the Penal Code section 12022.5, subd. (a), gun use enhancement relating to count 1 (murder of Byrd) was 10 years, and the Penal Code section 12022.5, subd. (a), gun use enhancement relating to count 3 (robbery of Krystal Anderson) was stayed. The judgment was affirmed as so corrected.

Defendant was convicted of the first degree murders of two victims under the special circumstance of multiple murder and lying in wait, of three counts of premeditated attempted murder, and of possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant was sentenced to death. On automatic appeal, the court considered several guilt phase issues and penalty phase issues, and ultimately affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner faced charges of first degree murder with a special circumstance. In compliance with his statutory pretrial discovery obligations, he notified the prosecution of his intent to introduce evidence, through designated expert witnesses, that he suffered from neurocognitive deficits as a result of childhood brain trauma or congenital brain dysfunction. In response, the prosecution obtained an order for his examination by a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a neurologist chosen by the prosecution. Invoking his federal constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination, petitioner sought various protective orders as conditions of his submission to court-ordered mental examinations. The court held that, by forcing the trial court to resolve defense claims of privilege prior to trial, without prosecutorial access to the evidence in dispute, the Court of Appeal majority has imposed procedures that were neither required nor justified by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and were manifestly unfair to the prosecution. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment with directions to deny the petition for mandamus.

Defendant was convicted of murder and contended that the trial court violated his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment by barring his attorney from discussing with him the existence or contents of a sealed transcript of a witness's part of those proceedings. The court held that defendant could obtain relief on that claim only by establishing that the trial court's order affected the reliability of the trial process, a question not addressed by the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

After defendant waived a jury trial, the court found him guilty of first degree murder under the special circumstances of robbery and burglary murder, of robbery, and of burglary. The court also found defendant personally used a firearm in committing each of the offenses and personally inflicted great bodily injury in committing the robbery and murder. Defendant was sentenced to death and this automatic appeal followed. The court affirmed the judgment after addressing issues related to the jury trial waiver; alleged prosecutorial misconduct; cumulative guilt phase error; victim-impact evidence; testimony that defendant displayed hatred; considering mitigating evidence as aggravating evidence; cumulative error affecting the penalty; automatic application to modify the verdict; and challenges to California's Death Penalty Law.