Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Fredrick Terry was found guilty of and sentenced for the felony murder of James Hansell and for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial. Furthermore, he challenged the jury instructions ultimately given by the trial court. Finding the evidence sufficient for the jury to convict him, and that the trial court made no error in its admission of certain evidence and in its instructions to the jury, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in this professional negligence action to address: (1) the standard for harmless error where a trial court refuses to strike an unqualified juror; and, (2) the trial court's duties under OCGA 9-10-185 to remedy prejudicial statements by counsel. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of both issues, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether application of OCGA 32-3-11(c) pertaining to appellants' motion to set aside or vacate a declaration of taking violated their due process rights, and whether that statute imposed upon appellant the responsibility to obtain a timely hearing on their motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute as properly applied does not violate a condemnee's due process rights but reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with direction that it hold a hearing pursuant to the mandate of 32-3-11(c) because it is the duty of the trial court, not the condemnee, to schedule the required hearing.

Following a jury trial, appellant Steven Wayne Abston was convicted of malice murder and possession of a knife during the commission of certain crimes in connection with the stabbing death of his father, Jeffrey Abston. Abston appealed the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Appellant Brandon Green was convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of Teressa Owens. On appeal, he contended he received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to certain hearsay testimony. More specifically, he argued trial counsel should have objected when the prosecution introduced out-of-court statements: made to a police officer by an eyewitness who lived in the same room as Appellant and who said she saw Appellant put a gun to the victim's head and pull the trigger; made to the victim's brother by several bystanders shortly after the shooting informing him that appellant and the victim had an argument; and, that they had been dating. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Pro se Appellant Dexter Wendell Green appealed a trial court's order which granted the State's motion to dismiss appellant's motion for an out-of-time appeal. In 1990, appellant entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder. In May 2011, appellant moved for an out-of-time appeal, claiming he was not indicted, or that he involuntarily waived the indictment, and that the trial court failed to question him about the voluntariness of his plea. Appellant also alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that he could withdraw his guilty plea. Finding that Appellant's claims lacked merit, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Derrick Cartwright was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The trial court denied Cartwright's motion for a new trial and he appealed, challenging only the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Petitioner Jose Alonso Martinez was not a citizen of the United States, but he became a permanent legal resident in 2008. In 2010, he entered a guilty plea to aggravated battery and received a probated sentence of seven years. As a result, Petitioner has since been taken into custody by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and faced deportation and banishment from the United States. In 2011, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of plea counsel. After a hearing, the habeas court granted relief, finding that plea counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner that he "need not be concerned about immigration consequences" of entering the guilty plea. The habeas court further found that, although the trial court warned Petitioner that he would almost certainly face deportation should he proceed with the plea, he was also receiving advice from his attorney calling into question the information from the trial court, and he likely relied more heavily on counsel's advice. The State appealed the habeas court's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the habeas court's decision on the prejudice prong was based primarily on its finding that Petitioner "was also receiving advice from his attorney and that advice called into question the information he was receiving from the court. . . . Such a finding of a contemporaneous contradiction of the trial court, if authorized by the evidence, may undermine the curative effect of an otherwise clear warning of adverse immigration consequences. So too may prior advice by counsel to disregard any such warning. However, neither circumstance is demonstrated by the evidence in this case." Regardless of the prior erroneous advice from plea counsel, the trial court correctly informed Petitioner of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, and he therefore failed to prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance.

In this premises liability action, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified two questions to the state Supreme Court: (1) In a premises liability case in which the jury determines a defendant property owner negligently failed to prevent a foreseeable criminal attack, is the jury allowed to consider the "fault" of the criminal assailant and apportion its award of damages among the property owner and the criminal assailant, pursuant to OCGA section 51-12-33?; and (2) would jury instructions or a special verdict form requiring the jury to apportion its award of damages among the property owner and the criminal assailant result in a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights to a jury trial, due process or equal protection? The plaintiff in this case suffered a violent attack by unknown criminal assailants while staying in a hotel and subsequently brought suit against the owner of the hotel for failing to keep the premises safe. Upon review, the Supreme Court found: (1) the jury is allowed to apportion damages among the property owner and the criminal assailant and (2) instructions or a special verdict form requiring such apportionment would not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Defendant Michael Curry appealed his convictions for the malice murders of Ann Curry, Erika Curry, and Ryan Curry. Responding to a phone call from the neighbors in 1985, police found the bodies of Defendant's eight-months-pregnant wife, Ann, and those of their children, 4-year-old Erika and 20-month-old Ryan. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant asserted: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the delay of almost 24 years between the crimes and his indictment violated his due process rights under the State and Federal Constitutions; and (3) that the State improperly commented on his right to remain silent in three instances. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no merit to any of Defendant's issues raised on appeal, and affirmed his conviction.