Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of speeding ninety-four miles per hour in a sixty-five mile-per-hour zone, holding that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional right to a jury trial.In affirming Defendant's conviction, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals concluded that, even though the trial court failed to follow the statutory procedure for waiver of Defendant's right to a jury trial, Defendant was not prejudiced. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the trial court's colloquy was untimely, the facts demonstrated that Defendant understood he was waiving his right to a trial by jury and the consequences of that decision; and (2) Defendant did not meet his burden of demonstrating that there was no reasonable possibility that had the error not been committed a different result would have been reached in a bench trial or a jury trial. View "State v. Hamer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage claim, holding that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and N.C. Const. art. I, 12 explicitly protect petitioning activity, including Defendants' speech in this case.Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging that, by virtue of intentional and malicious misrepresentations made to a town, Defendants tortiously interfered with Plaintiff's prospective economic advantage by inducing a third party not to perform the purchase of certain property. Plaintiff's suit was based on Defendants' presentation at certain rezoning hearings. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, asserting that they were immune from liability because their statements to the town were constitutionally protected petitioning activity. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court court reversed, holding that Defendants' petitioning was protected by the First Amendment and Article I, Section 12. View "Cheryl Lloyd Humphrey Land Investment Co., LLC v. Resco Products, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that governmental immunity did not bar Plaintiff's claim under the North Carolina Constitution for a school board's deliberate indifference to continual student harassment.Plaintiffs alleged that the school board's indifference denied students their constitutionally-guaranteed right to the opportunity to receive a sound basis education under N.C. Const. art. I, 15. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing in part that the claim under the North Carolina Constitution was barred by the defense of sovereign or governmental immunity. The trial court denied the motion in part and allowed the constitutional claim to proceed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that abuse or an abusive classroom environment does not violate a constitutional right to education. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where a government entity with control over the school is deliberately indifferent to ongoing harassment that prevents a student from accessing his constitutionally guaranteed right to a sound basic education, the student has a colorable claim under the state Constitution. View "Deminski v. State Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals ordering a new trial in this case on the grounds that the prosecutor's commentary on Defendant's decision to plead not guilty was so unfair it violated Defendant's due process rights, holding that the prosecutor's comments did not so prejudice Defendant so as to warrant a new trial.Defendant was found guilty of several offenses after a jury trial. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to intervene ex mero motu when the prosecutor made improper remarks about Defendant's decision to plead not guilty during closing arguments. The court of appeals agreed and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced as a result of the prosecutor's improper closing arguments. View "State v. Goins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for second-degree murder, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence generated from his blood but that the error was not prejudicial.In denying Defendant's suppression motion the court of appeals held that the trial court erred by not excluding Defendant's blood test results but that Defendant failed to carry his burden to show that the denial of his motion to suppress resulted in prejudicial error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals applied the incorrect standard for determining prejudice resulting from the violation of Defendant's rights under the United States Constitution. View "State v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals vacating Defendants' convictions of second-degree murder and ordering a new trial, holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error in excluding evidence that was highly relevant as to Defendants' self-defense claims.Defendants, Thomas Martens and his daughter, Molly Corbett, were found guilty of murdering Molly's husband, Jason Corbett. During trial, Defendants maintained that they had lawfully used deadly force to defend themselves while under a reasonable apprehension that they were facing an imminent threat of deadly harm during an interaction initiated by Jason. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial, holding that the trial court erroneously excluded certain evidence, thus depriving Defendants of their ability to present a full and meaningful defense. View "State v. Corbett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for appropriately relief filed after he was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, holding that certain undisclosed evidence was material and that it was reasonably probable that, had it been disclosed to Defendant prior to trial, the outcome would have been different.Defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary, first-degree rape, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In postconviction proceedings, it became clear that the State failed to produce certain pieces of evidence to Defendant prior to his trial. Later that year, postconviction counsel uncovered additional evidence. Defendant then filed a motion for appropriate relief, arguing that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of his due process right pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case with instruction to grant the motion and order a new trial, holding that the failure to disclose the exculpatory evidence prejudiced Defendant's ability to present a defense. View "State v. Best" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it "flatly prohibited questioning as to issues of race and implicit bias during voir dire" and that the trial court's improper restrictions on Defendant's questioning during voir dire prejudiced Defendant.Defendant was convicted of several crimes, including robbery with a dangerous weapon and second-degree kidnapping. On appeal, Defendant challenged the trial court's refusal to allow him to pursue during voir dire certain lines of inquiry relating to racial bias and police-officer shootings of black civilians. The court of appeals rejected Defendant's claims and found no error in the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion and prejudiced Defendant by restricting all inquiry into prospective jurors' racial biases and opinions regarding police officer shootings of black men. View "State v. Crump" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the scheduling and procedural circumstances existent in this case did not constitute an infringement upon Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree sex offense with a child and indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him because the State violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial by failing to calendar his trial date for approximately five years following the issuance of the indictments against him. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that here was no speedy trial violation. The Supreme Court affirmed after weighing the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as they applied to the circumstances of this case, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. View "State v. Farmer" on Justia Law

In this dispute in which Plaintiffs sought reimbursement for healthcare costs based upon claims for restraint of trade and monopolization pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 75 and N.C. Const. art. I, 34, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the trial court deciding issues arising from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the trial court erred in part.Plaintiffs were a group of current and former North Carolina residents who were covered under the commercial health insurance obtained through the Hospital Authority, a non-profit corporation providing healthcare services with a principal place of business in Charlotte. The trial court granted the Hospital Authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs' restraint of trade and monopolization claims but denied the motion with respect to Plaintiffs' monopolization claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs' Chapter 75 restraint of trade and monopolization claims; but (2) erred by denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs' claim pursuant to article I, section 34. View "DiCesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth" on Justia Law