Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified two questions under the Revised Uniform Certified Questions of Law Act. Plaintiff-Appellant Oklahoma Corrections Professionals Association having a membership of approximately nineteen hundred state employees, filed suit against Defendant-Appellee Oscar B. Jackson, Jr., Administrator and Cabinet Secretary for Human Resources, in federal district court. It sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting the termination of voluntary payroll deductions for members of the Corrections Association scheduled to terminate on January 31, 2011 along with preservation of the "status quo" which it defined as an order requiring reinstatement of dues collection through the voluntary payroll deduction program should payroll deductions be terminated before the district court could act. The Corrections Association alleged that the 2008 amendment was designed to eliminate, by doubling the membership requirements for voluntary payroll deductions, the organization as a rival to the Oklahoma Public Employees Association. The Corrections Association contended that its very existence was dependent on collecting membership dues through the payroll deduction system. It asserted that: 1) the Public Employees Association was unfairly exempted from the numerosity requirement; and 2) the new membership requirement should be invalidated as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The federal district court issued an order dismissing the Correction Association's federal claims for lack of standing and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. Specifically, the district court held that the Correction Association had not met standing requirements of redressability. Even assuming the statutory provision's unconstitutionality, it reasoned that: 1) striking the offending statutory subsection would not restore the availability of voluntary payroll deductions; and 2) because the Legislature would not have included the provision without the numerosity provision, severing the requirement would amount to "rewriting" the law. Thus the question from the federal district court, reformulated as a question of first impression for the Oklahoma Supreme Court was: "[w]hether the two thousand (2,000) membership numerosity requirement of 62 O.S. 2011 sec. 34.70(B)(5), if determined to conflict with constitutional guarantees of free speech, may be severed pursuant to 75 O.S. 2011 sec. 11a?" The Court answered the question "yes."

The State pursuant to Grand Jury Proceedings in Pawnee County, accused Appellant Roger Lee Price, the elected Sheriff of Pawnee County, of wilful neglect of duty and sought his removal from office. A jury trial was held and the jury unanimously determined that Price was guilty of two accusations of wilful neglect of duty. Pursuant to the jury verdict, the trial judge ordered that the Sheriff be removed from office. Price filed a motion for a new trial which the trial court denied. Price appealed, alleging numerous errors. The Supreme Court retained the appeal, consolidated the issues, and after review, held that: 1) there was no error under the facts presented in allowing the State to prove only two of the three alleged acts of wilful conduct when seeking removal of the sheriff; 2) the trial court properly modified the proposed jury instructions to conform to the evidence presented; and 3) the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a demurrer to the evidence/directed verdict.

In 2010, the Oklahoma Legislature amended the Oklahoma Tax Code to require municipalities to contract with the State of Oklahoma through the Oklahoma Tax Commission to assess, collect and enforce municipal taxes. Prior to the amendment becoming effective, the City of Tulsa contracted with a private company to collect municipal taxes. On August 19, 2010, Tulsa filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the District Court of Oklahoma County to challenge the statute's constitutionality. The trial court found the statute unconstitutional. The State appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Upon review, the Court held that the amendments requiring the Commission to collect municipal sales and use taxes do not unconstitutionally impair Tulsa's obligation of contracts or infringe its inherent powers granted by the Constitution or the City's charter.

Defendants-Appellants John and Lisa Alexander appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for for Credit Suisse First Boston HEAT 2005-4. Defendants executed a note to MILA, Inc., DBA Mortgage Investment Lending Associates, Inc. and a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for MILA and its successors and assigns. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. filed a foreclosure petition on in 2009, alleging Appellants defaulted on the note. The petition further states Wells Fargo was the present holder of the note and mortgage, and Wells Fargo took the note and mortgage for good and valuable consideration from the original lender. A copy of the note and part of the mortgage was attached to the original petition. The note attached to the original petition contained no indorsements. An Order Granting Motion for Substitution of Plaintiff and Modification of Caption was filed. Appellee, U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee, for Credit Suisse First Boston HEAT 2005-4 was substituted in place of Wells Fargo. The motion stated Wells Fargo had subsequently assigned all of its rights in the mortgage to Appellee. Appellee also filed its First Amended Petition which re-alleged all of the allegations of Wells Fargo's petition and identified additional defendants as parties who may have an interest in the property. Appellee attached to the amended petition, a copy of the same unindorsed note and mortgage originally executed by Appellant John W. Alexander, III, in 2005. Appellants never answered the petition and a judgment was entered against then in April 2010. A day later, Appellants' counsel made an entry of appearance and the judgment was vacated. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellee claimed in its motion for summary judgment that it was the holder of the note and mortgage, and that Appellants had been in constant default since the July 1, 2009, installment payment was due. Appellants filed an objection to Appellee's motion for summary judgment and later filed a supplement to the objection. Appellants challenged certain comments in Wells Fargo's motion to substitute which stated Wells Fargo subsequently assigned its rights under the mortgage to Appellee after the filing of the original petition. Appellants assert the note provided by Appellee does not have an indorsement and they claim such indorsement is necessary under the Uniform Commercial Code. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellee did not have the proper supporting ducomentation in hand when it filed its foreclosure suit. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Guy and Midge Ledbetter sued Defendant-Appellant Derek Howard and his employer Radiology Services of Ardmore, Inc. for malpractice. Plaintiffs alleged that the doctor misread an x-ray which caused delayed treatment of his rapidly deteriorating left foot. A jury found in favor of Defendant. Plaintiffs moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The trial court denied the judgment but granted a new trial when evidence of juror misconduct surfaced. Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. The foreperson assured the trial court in voir dire that she would not allow her expertise and experience to override the evidence presented at trial. Nevertheless, she not only did so on a personal level, but went further by communicating her alleged professional knowledge and experiences to her fellow jurors with the apparent intent to sway their votes in favor of Defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the juror's affidavit was admissible under the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception to 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 2606(B); and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial for juror misconduct during deliberations.

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned a petition for rehearing a prior Supreme Court order that granted Appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal because of an untimely filed petition in error. Appellants' Appletree Enterprise, Inc.'s Petition in Error was filed January 4, 2012, and Appellee Whitehall Homeowners Association, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the Journal Entry was filed in the District Court on December 2, 2011 and mailed to Appellants' counsel on that date. Appellee argued that the Journal Entry was mailed within three days as required by 12 O.S.2011 Sections 696.2 and 990A(A), and that the date for Appellants to bring an appeal commenced on December 2, 2011. Appellee argued on rehearing that predecisional orders are not subject to rehearing. Further, Appellee argued that the Supreme Court's dismissal order was one of those predecisional orders and thus not subject to a petition for rehearing. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded Appellee's argument was incorrect. The Court concluded that noncompliance with 990A (A) results in a time to commence the appeal starting when Appellants received actual notice. Appellants' petition in error was timely filed. The motion to dismiss filed by Appellee, Whitehall Homeowners Association, Inc., based upon allegations of untimely filing of the petition in error, was denied with prejudice to its reconsideration or renewal in this appeal.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the first-impression question of whether a bail bondsman's failure to timely pay the order and judgment of forfeiture within ninety-one (91) days after receipt of notice prevents the bondsman from seeking remitter of forfeiture proceeds after returning Defendant to custody pursuant to section 1332(D)(2). Here, the bondsman paid the judgment of forfeiture on the ninety-second day after receipt of notice of forfeiture. The trial judge conducted a hearing at which she granted the bondsman's motion for remitter, ordered return of the money deposited and vacated the order and judgment of forfeiture. The State appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative: the deposit of the face amount of the bond by the ninety-first day after notice of forfeiture, as required by 59 O.S. Supp. 2008 sec. 1332(D)(1) is a condition precedent to seeking the relief of remitter provided by section 1332 (D)(2).

Claimant Carl Wynne was a truck driver. While he was in Tennessee driving a truck for his former employer, he heard that Triad Transport, Inc. was hiring. Claimant called Triad’s headquarters in McAlester and spoke to a recruiter who had hiring authority. Claimant requested that an application be sent by fax to Odessa, Texas, where he lived. He completed the application and sent it by fax to McAlester. A week or so later, the recruiter phoned while Claimant was driving somewhere between Georgia and Arizona that his application had been approved. Claimant agreed to travel to McAlester for orientation. He returned his prior employer's truck to a terminal in Tuscon, Arizona, and a Triad employee gave him a ride to a Triad satellite terminal in Laveen, Arizona. There, he passed a drug test, was provided a fuel card, and dispatched to Rockwall, Texas with a load. In 2010, Claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Colorado while he was driving Triad’s truck. He filed a Form 3 claim for benefits in the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court which Triad opposed. The trial tribunal conducted a hearing solely on the issue of the court's jurisdiction. Two witnesses were presented, Claimant and the President of Employer. Claimant testified concerning when and where he was actually hired, and Employer's President testified to the general hiring practices of his company. The recruiter was not called to testify. The trial tribunal made several findings of fact and concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the case of Claimant's subsequent injury as Claimant's hiring and final assent to permanent employment relationship between claimant and respondent occurred in Oklahoma. A three-judge panel of the Workers' Compensation Court unanimously affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court’s de novo review of the record, the testimony of the witnesses, and the arguments of the parties lead to the conclusion that Claimant's final assent to employment did not occur until he attended the orientation in Oklahoma, “[t]hat process began when Claimant first made contact with [Triad’s] recruiter, but it did not end until Claimant gave his final assent to employment during the orientation in Oklahoma. The Workers' Compensation Court did not err in determining that it has jurisdiction to hear the claim.”

Appellants David and Barbara Moore defaulted on the Note to their mortgage in 2008. U.S. Bank, National Association, commenced foreclosure proceedings later that year, not in its individual capacity, but solely as trustee on behalf of GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6 (Appellee). According to the verified petition, the Appellee was "the present holder of said Note and Mortgage having received due assignment through mesne assignments of record or conveyance via mortgaging servicing transfer." The original petition did not attach a copy of the note in question sued upon. Appellants answered, pro se in 2009, disputing all allegations and requesting that the Appellee "submit additional documentation to prove [its] claims including the representation that they were the "present holder of said Note." Appellee subsequently filed an amended petition and a second amended petition to add additional defendants. Neither of these amendments included a copy of the note. Appellee submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment to the court, again representing that it was the holder of the Note. Documentation attached to the Motion attempted to support this representation: including the Mortgage, the Note, an Assignment of Mortgage, and an Affidavit in Support of Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the first time, Appellee submitted the Note and Mortgage to the trial court. The note was indorsed in blank and contained no date for the indorsement. Appellants did not respond to Appellee's Motion, and the trial court entered a default judgment against them. The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the Appellee. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no evidence in the record establishing that Appellee had standing to commence its foreclosure action: “[t]he trial court's granting of a default judgment in favor of Appellee could not have been rationally based upon the evidence or Oklahoma law.” The Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A jury returned verdicts in favor of all defendants on plaintiffs' medical malpractice claims. Thereafter, plaintiffs learned that a juror had voluntarily disclosed bias towards plaintiffs' cause of action and plaintiffs' race. Plaintiffs sought a new trial on this and other grounds. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for new trial. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals unanimously rejected all of plaintiffs' grounds for new trial except the claim of juror bias on a majority vote. In rejecting this ground, the majority ruled the juror's post-verdict statements were impermissible impeachment of the jury verdicts. The dissenting judge concluded otherwise, noting the juror's statements were his own public, voluntary statements (not related by other jurors) and revealed the juror was intent on serving on the case with a predisposition to an outcome adverse to the plaintiffs. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion: "the juror in question entertained bias against the plaintiffs' race and their right to recover under the appropriate burden of proof. In reaching this conclusion, [the Court] first note[ed] that this [was] not a case where dissenting or minority jurors are attempting to impeach a verdict with which they do not agree by breaching the sanctity of the jury deliberations. This [was] a case where a juror voluntarily revealed, after verdicts were returned, that (1) the juror entertained disqualifying bias against one party's race and right to recover under the appropriate burden of proof, and (2) deliberately concealed such bias upon voir dire in order to participate in rendering verdicts consistent with such bias." The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial.