Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This case was not about probation; it was about parole. Purporting to rely on certain passages from Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2019) and the statutes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined in that decision, the trial court held “a sentencing court may not delegate its statutorily pr[e]scribed duties” but must instead personally “communicate any conditions of probation or parole as a prerequisite to violating any such condition.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal to consider whether the trial court improperly expanded Foster in this regard. As the Supreme Court concluded it did, judgment was reversed in part. "[T]here is no dispute the parole conditions appellee violated were imposed by the county probation office rather than the state Parole Board. ... there was nothing improper about that, and the Superior Court erred in concluding otherwise. We therefore reverse its decision in that respect and remand for further proceedings." View "Pennsylvania v. Koger" on Justia Law

This case was one of many lawsuits concerning Act 13 of 2012, which amended Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act. Act 13 included the grant of authority by the General Assembly to the Agencies to promulgate regulations for unconventional gas wells. In October 2016, the Marcellus Shale Coalition (the “MSC”) filed a Petition seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, raising seven counts, only one of which was at issue in this appeal. That count pertained to portions of the regulations set forth at Sections 78a.1 and 78a.15. Each challenged regulatory provision interacted to some degree with Section 3215 of the Oil and Gas Act of 2012, titled “Well location restrictions.” In this appeal as of right, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to pass upon the breadth of the legislative rulemaking authority given to the Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department”) and the Environmental Quality Board (the “Board”) (collectively, the “Agencies”) by the General Assembly in the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act of 1984. The Agencies contended the Commonwealth Court erroneously concluded that they exceeded their authority and consequently struck down certain regulations designed to aid the Agencies in information gathering attendant to the issuance of permits for new unconventional gas wells. The Supreme Court found the General Assembly intended to give the Agencies the leeway to promulgate the challenged regulations and that those regulations were reasonable. The Court therefore reversed the Commonwealth Court. View "Marcellus Shale Coalition v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, et al." on Justia Law

In March 2016, Appellant Jose Vellon was arrested for DUI of alcohol pursuant to Subsection 3802(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment). A violation of this statute constituted an “ungraded misdemeanor.” Vellon was accepted into the Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition (“ARD”) Program. Several months later, police charged Vellon with another DUI. As a result of the Second DUI, the trial court entered an order removing Vellon from ARD. Vellon pleaded guilty to the First and Second DUIs, and in October 2017, he was sentenced on both DUI violations. Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (“PennDOT”) informed Vellon that it would be suspending his driving privileges as a collateral consequence of his DUI convictions pursuant to Section 3804 of the Vehicle Code. Vellon appealed only his license suspension for the First DUI. In this appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that, in drafting Section 3806, the General Assembly intended to mandate that, when a defendant is sentenced for two driving-under- the-influence (“DUI”) offenses on the same day, both offenses had be considered prior offenses to each other with each warranting civil recidivist collateral consequences, despite the facts that the defendant committed the DUI violations at different points in time and had never previously been convicted of DUI. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Commonwealth Court and reversed that court’s order. View "Vellon v. Dept of Transportation" on Justia Law

In Commonwealth v. Eid, 249 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2021), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Section 1543(b)(1.1)(i) of the Vehicle Code unconstitutionally vague in contravention of state and federal due process principles because it failed to specify a maximum term of imprisonment. The Court granted allowance of appeal in this case to determine whether another subsection of that same statute, Section 1543(b)(1)(iii), was unconstitutional for similarly failing to specify a maximum term of imprisonment. The Court declined to find this provision unconstitutional and therefore affirmed the Superior Court’s order. View "Pennsylvania v. Rollins" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned whether Dr. Timothy Shrom and Debra Shrom were eligible under the Pennsylvania Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act (Act) for payment from the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Fund (Fund) for costs they incurred in remediating contamination caused by fuel releases from underground storage tanks (USTs or tanks) located on their property. The Fund concluded, and the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Board (Board) ultimately agreed, that the Shroms were ineligible for such payment because the subject USTs were not registered with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) as required by Section 503 of the Act and the registration fees were not paid at the time of the fuel releases that gave rise to the Shroms’ claim for remediation costs. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s decision on appeal, concluding that: (1) the Shroms were eligible to receive payment from the Fund for remediation costs under the Act; (2) the Board’s holding relative to the timing of the payment of the Section 503 registration fees constituted an unlawful de facto regulation; and (3) contrary to the Board’s finding, payment of the Shroms’ claim did not appear to pose any imminent risk to the Fund’s solvency. Finding no error in the Commonwealth Court’s decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shrom, et al v PA Underground Storage Tank" on Justia Law

Appellant Damien Green appealed a superior court order which quashed his appeal of a Court of Common Pleas order. The superior court concluded the trial court’s order, granting decertification to a juvenile who was to be tried as an adult for murder, constituted a legal nullity because the decertification order was not filed within the time constraints set forth in Section 6322(b) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 6322(b), and Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 597 (Rule 597). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted review in this case to consider, as a matter of first impression, whether a transfer order filed after the 20-day limitation in Section 6322 of the Juvenile Act and Rule 597 was a legal nullity or should exceptions created by Pennsylvania jurisprudence under similar rules and statutes be applicable. Following oral argument, the Supreme Court entered a per curiam order October 28, 2022, affirming the Superior Court’s order quashing the appeal. The order also remanded the matter to the trial court for immediate entry of an order by the clerk of courts pursuant to Rule 597(D). View "Pennsylvania v. Green" on Justia Law

In 2010, Appellant Dontez Perrin was convicted after a non-jury trial of conspiracy, aggravated assault, robbery, possessing instruments of crime, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person, receiving stolen property, firearms not to be carried without a license, and possession of firearm by minor for his role in the robbery and assault of victim Rodney Thompson when Thompson arrived at an apartment to deliver a pizza. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of five to ten years’ imprisonment. In an appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the trial court erred in refusing to accept a proposed stipulation as to witness credibility in the context of a post-sentence motion for a new trial. As the Supreme Court determined the trial court was well within its right to reject the proposed stipulation, it affirmed its denial of Appellant’s motion. View "Pennsylvania v. Perrin" on Justia Law

The U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The question centered on the single issue of whether Pennsylvania’s first-degree aggravated assault provision, codified at 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1), required some use of physical force. Appellant Marc Harris pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentenced Appellant pursuant to the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Notably, the ACCA defines the term “violent felony” as including any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year that, inter alia: (1) “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (“element of force clause”). The Supreme Court answered this inquiry in the negative, holding that the offense of aggravated assault under Section 2702(a)(1) did not require the actor to exercise physical force when inflicting or attempting to inflict serious bodily injury upon the victim. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

This case arose from the April 2008 murder of D.B., a two-year-old child living with her mother and appellant Harve Johnson, mother’s boyfriend. Johnson appealed a Court of Common Pleas denying his first, timely petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Johnson raised twenty-two claims; following a comprehensive review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded none entitled him to relief and affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In a discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether Global Positioning System (“GPS”) data compiled from a GPS monitoring device on a parolee, was inadmissible hearsay. After careful consideration, the Court held that the challenged evidence was not hearsay because it does not constitute a statement made by a declarant, as outlined in Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 801, as it is not an assertion (or the nonverbal conduct) of a person. View "Pennsylvania v. Wallace" on Justia Law