Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner-Appellant Alvin Valenzuela, an enrolled member of the Tohono O’odham Nation filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from tribal court convictions and his sentence. While Petitioner's petition was pending in federal district court, he completed his sentence and was released from prison. The district court concluded that Petitioner's claims were moot because of his release. Alternatively, it concluded that Petitioner had failed to exhaust his tribal remedies before seeking habeas relief in federal court. Based on these alternative grounds, the district court dismissed the petition. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed on the ground that Mr. Valenzuela failed to exhaust his tribal court remedies and remanded the case for the district court to dismiss his petition without prejudice. View "Valenzuela v. Silversmith, et al" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possessing more than 100 kilograms of marijuana with the intent to distribute. He was sentenced to sixty months' imprisonment followed by four years of supervised release, and he appealed. Defendant argued to the Tenth Circuit that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights when it refused to allow him to cross-examine a witness about a prior judicial determination that the witness was not credible. Considering the "Van Arsdall" factors, the Court concluded there was at least a "reasonable probability" the jury would have reached a different conclusion had the jury not believed the inspector smelled the strong smell of marijuana when Defendant opened the trailer doors, or if the impeachment value of the cross-examination had been fully realized: "At the very least, the government [did] not meet its extraordinary burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Accordingly, Defendant's conviction was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Woodard" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether a judgment has been "entered on the criminal docket" for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(6) if it is noted only on an internal district court document that is not publicly accessible. Following sentencing of Defendant-Appellant Francisco Mendoza, the district court filed a sealed judgment on a document labeled "Criminal Docket . . .Internal Use Only." The criminal docket available to the public contained no indication that judgment was ever entered. Upon review, the Court concluded that this procedure did not satisfy Rule 4(b)(6): "Dockets and docket sheets have traditionally been considered public documents. Consistent with a centuries-long history of public access to dockets, we hold that the phrase 'entered on the criminal docket' contemplates public notation that judgment has been entered. Entry on a list of filings maintained for internal court use and inaccessible to the public does not qualify under the ordinary meaning of Rule 4(b)(6)." View "United States v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

After Defendant Austin Alan Ray was arrested for downloading child pornography using peer-to-peer file-sharing software, he pled guilty in federal district court to receiving material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. This appeal presented the question whether the district court could properly apply a two-level sentencing enhancement for the distribution of child pornography under USSG section 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) when the record indicated only that Defendant used the peer-to-peer file-sharing software and that its sharing function was enabled, but not that Defendant actually knew his software was capable of sharing files. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that the guideline was properly applied. The Court also rejected Defendant’s claims that the district court unconstitutionally made findings for sentencing enhancements under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that the court erred procedurally at sentencing, and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant’s sentence. View "United States v. Ray" on Justia Law

Pro se prisoner Defendant Brian Prendergast petitioned the Tenth Circuit for a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court's denial of his application for a writ of habeas corpus. Defendant was convicted by a Colorado jury on twelve counts of securities fraud and one count of theft over $15,000. He appealed his conviction and was sentenced to concurrent terms of ten years of probation on each count. After his conviction, Defendant violated the terms of his probation on a number of occasions and was accordingly resentenced. In 2009, the State revoked his probation and Defendant was ultimately resentenced to concurrent six-year terms in prison. On petition to the Tenth Circuit, Defendant raised five claims: two attached the constitutionality of his 2009 resentencing; the remaining three attached the basis of his original conviction. The district court dismissed the two claims relating to the 2009 resentencing, and dismissed the remaining three as untimely. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit Court of appeals found no reason to disturb the district court's rulings and affirmed. View "Prendergast v. Clements, et al" on Justia Law

The defendants in this case filed interlocutory appeals from a district order that granted a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiff, an association of individual members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and beneficiaries of a charitable religious trust (FLDS Association). The FLDS Association alleged six claims for relief: (1) a claim for declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging deprivation of the FLDS Association's rights under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) a claim for declaratory relief under Article 1, Sections 1 and 4 of the Utah Constitution; (3) a claim for violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc; (4) a claim that Utah Code Ann. 76-7-101, which prohibits plural marriage, was unconstitutional as applied under the federal and state constitutions; (5) a claim that Utah Code Ann. sections 75-7-1001, -412(1), and -413(1)(c) were unconstitutional as applied; and (6) a claim for injunctive relief against the defendants' continuing administration of the UEP Trust. The FLDS Association also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the probate court's ongoing administration of the UEP Trust. The federal suit was stayed pending the parties' settlement negotiations. After granting the defendants' motion for an emergency stay pending resolution of these appeals, the Tenth Circuit certified a question to the Utah Supreme Court regarding the preclusive effect of laches under Utah law of dismissal, of a petition for extraordinary writ. The Court received its answer from the Utah court and vacated the district court's preliminary injunction, remanding the case to dismiss the FLDS Association's claims as barred by res judicata. View "Fundamentalist Church of Jesus v. Wisan (Horne Appeal), et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Rural Water District No. 2 Creek County, Oklahoma, a rural water provider covered by 7 U.S.C. 1926(b), and Defendant Glenpool Utility Services Authority, a public trust created to provide water service, and its beneficiary, Defendant City of Glenpool, entered into a Settlement Agreement under which Plaintiff agreed not to file a civil action pursuant to section 1926(b) during the term of the agreement unless Defendants defaulted on their contractual obligations. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the civil action underlying this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging Defendants violated section 1926(b). The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The issue on appeal to the Tenth Circuit centered on whether Plaintiff’s agreement not to file a civil action against Defendants, absent default, deprived the Court of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where a state court had not yet determined whether Defendants defaulted. Upon review, the Court held that such agreement did not deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction, and it reversed and remanded. View "Rural Wtr Dist No 2 Creek Cnty v. City of Glenpool, et al" on Justia Law

The dispute before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on interest earned on block grants made to Indian tribes pursuant to the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act. Specifically, Appellant Muscogee (Creek) Nation's Division of Housing challenged both a regulation placing a two-year limit on the investment of grant funds and two notices issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development stating that any interest accrued after the expiration of this two-year period must be returned to the Department. The Nation sought declaratory relief invalidating the regulation and notices as well as an injunction to prevent HUD from recouping interest earned on grant funds. The Nation also sought recoupment of the approximately $1.3 million of earned interest it wired to HUD after HUD sent a letter threatening an enforcement action based on the Nation’s investment of grant funds for longer than two years. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that HUD’s sovereign immunity was not waived by the Administrative Procedures Act and, in the alternative, that the Nation had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted because HUD’s interpretation of the statute was permissible. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that HUD was authorized to promulgate a regulation limiting the period for investments, and required to demand remittance of interest earned in violation of the regulation. The Nation was therefore not entitled to recouping the interest it paid to HUD pursuant to HUD's enforcement of its rules. View "Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. HUD, et al" on Justia Law

Debtor Peter Woodman filed two timely notices of appeal from an adverse decision by the bankruptcy court. One appeal was heard by the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP), which dismissed the appeal a month later for failure to prosecute. The other was heard by the district court, which decided to consider the matter despite the prior BAP ruling but ruled against Mr. Woodman on the merits. He appealed the district court's judgment. Finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear his appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's judgment. View "Woodman v. Aspen Hills Properties, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Kaufman brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that the Defendants, all Colorado police officers, had violated his constitutional rights by arresting him without probable cause. In 2009, a vehicle driven by an unnamed female driver hit an unoccupied car in a jewelry store parking lot. Someone witnessed the incident, took down the car's license plate number and reported it to the Colorado State Patrol. Officers investigating the report learned that Plaintiff owned the car and had made a purchase at the store moments before the accident. Plaintiff cited "privilege" in refusing to tell the officers the name of the female driver. Frustrated, the officers advised Plaintiff that refusing to tell them the name of the driver could end in an arrest for obstruction of justice. Plaintiff refused and he was arrested. The district court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. As to a Fourth Amendment claim, the court concluded that there was no false arrest because the troopers had probable cause to believe Plaintiff's silence, accompanied by assertion of privilege, constituted a violation of the obstruction statute. The Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed. The Defendants never contended that their encounter with Plaintiff was other than consensual; the law was well established that a citizen has no obligation to answer an officer's questions during a consensual encounter; and the Colorado Supreme Court had made it clear that the Colorado obstruction statute is not violated by mere verbal opposition to an officer's questioning. "It follows that the Defendants could not have reasonably thought that they were justified in arresting Plaintiff and their motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity should have been denied." View "Kaufman v. Higgs, et al" on Justia Law