Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The City enacted into law several provisions that, inter alia, prohibit the commercial distribution of sexual devices within the City. Plaintiffs and intervenors brought, in relevant part, a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause challenge to Ordinance 2009-04-24, codified at section 38-120 of the City’s Code of Ordinances. The district court granted the City’s motion and entered an order upholding the Ordinance against each challenge. The court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim is foreclosed by the court's prior holding in Williams v. Attorney General (Williams IV), and the district court properly entered judgment on the pleadings for the City as to Intervenor-Appellant Henry’s First Amendment claims that the law burdens his artistic expression. The district court committed no reversible error as to any other claim properly raised on appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Flanigan's Enter. v. City of Sandy Springs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of her minor son D.H., filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against school officials, including Assistant Principal Tyrus McDowell, and others, alleging that defendants deprived D.H. of his rights to privacy, to be secure in his person, and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. On appeal, McDowell challenged the district court’s interlocutory order denying his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court found that McDowell’s strip search of D.H., a minor student, violated clearly established constitutional law. The court concluded that McDowell violated D.H.'s constitutional rights. Furthermore, a reasonable official in McDowell’s position would not have believed that requiring D.H. to strip down to his fully naked body in front of several of his peers was lawful in light of the clearly established principle that a student strip search, even if justified in its inception, must be “reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of McDowell’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. View "D. H. v. McDowell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendants violated students' constitutional rights when they detained the students for breathalyzer tests prior to entering their Junior/Senior Prom. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that plaintiffs have not established an actual or reasonable expectation of privacy in the party bus, which they had abandoned once they had exited for the Prom; the bus driver had apparent authority to consent to search the party bus; and therefore, the search of the party bus did not violate plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. The court also concluded that the initial waiting period for the breathalyzer mouthpieces and a trained individual to administer the breathalyzer tests was reasonable, because it was necessary for the testing; detaining a student after he or she was found to be alcohol free was not “reasonably related” to the reason for the detention “in the first place” of determining if the student passengers on the party bus had been drinking; the individual school defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there was no binding clearly established law at the time; and claims against the remaining defendants have been abandoned or have no merit. The court rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims. Because plaintiffs have not established that they should succeed on any of their allegations concerning their Fourth, First, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ziegler v. Martin Cnty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

After Terrance Bowen was beaten to death by his cellmate, Carl Merkerson, at Baldwin State Prison, the administrator of Bowen's estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Bowen's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated when he was housed in a cell with Merkerson. The district court dismissed the action, holding that it did not state Eighth Amendment claims against the prison officials and that, in any event, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed as to claims against Deputy Warden Doug Underwood and Corrections Officer Cager Edward Davis. In this case, Deputy Warden Underwood and Officer Davis allegedly knew from the population chart and the cell checklist that Merkerson, a convicted murderer, was designated a Level III mental health inmate who had been transferred to Unit K-3, “the lock-down segregation unit for disciplinary, protected custody and mental health individuals,” after assaulting his former cellmate. They also allegedly were aware of the specifics of Merkerson’s severe paranoid schizophrenia, his delusions, and his violent impulses. Therefore, the court concluded that the amended complaint alleges sufficient facts showing that Deputy Warden Underwood and Officer Davis were both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, and also drew the inference. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Bowen v. Warden" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs filed suit against Miami-Dade under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721–2725, the district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that their claims were not barred and the district court erred by not applying the discovery rule to 28 U.S.C. 1658(a). In regard to this issue of first impression, the court adopted the reasoning and conclusion of the Eighth Circuit in McDonough v. Anoka Cnty and concluded that a DPPA claim accrues under section 1658(b) when the violation occurs. In this case, the only alleged DPPA violations that implicate Miami-Dade occurred on January 10, 2008 and May 26, 2005. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against Miami-Dade on March 7, 2014, well beyond the four-year statute of limitations for DPPA claims. Because the district court properly applied the occurrence rule to section 1658(a), the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foudy v. Miami-Dade Cnty." on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Filbeck, a lieutenant with the sheriff's office, arrested the new owner's agents of his foreclosed home. Plaintiffs, who were lawfully performing their jobs, filed suit against Filbeck and the Sheriff, individually and in their official capacities, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for violation of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs alleged a conversion claim against all defendants. Plaintiffs further alleged claims for negligent hiring and retention, as well as for ratification. The court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to Filbeck based on qualified immunity where a jury could reasonably conclude on the record that Filbeck was never a tenant at sufferance after the foreclosure had been finalized, and he - not plaintiffs - was the intruder. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to Filbeck on the conversion claim where the evidence could establish a substantive claim of conversion under Georgia law. However, the court reversed the denial of summary judgment with respect to the County and Sheriff on the conversion claim because plaintiffs failed to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Carter v. Filbeck" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the Florida Supreme Court unlawfully denied her application to become a member of the Florida Bar in violation of federal bankruptcy law and her right to due process. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Florida Supreme Court denied plaintiff admission to the Bar based on her lack of candor and refusal to repay her financial obligations. The court concluded that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's 11 U.S.C. 525(a) claim; sovereign immunity bars plaintiff's due process claim because the Florida Supreme Court is a department of the State of Florida; and the Ex Parte Young exception is not applicable in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Uberoi v. Supreme Court of Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging disability discrimination and retaliation claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Florida law. At issue is whether defendant discriminated against plaintiff by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to perform either her duties or the essential duties of another position for which she was qualified. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims of discrimination failed. To the extent plaintiff intended to request a permanent light-duty position, it is undisputed that no such position existed. Defendant was not required by the ADA to create a permanent light-duty position especially for plaintiff. In regards to a request for a reassignment, plaintiff did not support the request with any evidence that there was a specific, full-duty vacant position she was qualified for and could have done, given her medical condition. Finally, the district court properly rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendant failed to initiate an “interactive process” to identify a reasonable accommodation, as required by ADA regulations. The court also concluded that plaintiff's retaliation claim fails where all of the evidence in the record shows that plaintiff was terminated solely as the result of her inability to return to full duty at the expiration of her eligibility for light-duty status. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Frazier-White v. Gee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the VA, alleging claims of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 626. The district court granted summary judgment for the VA. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish an element of their prima facie failure-to-hire case because they were not objectively qualified to perform the duties of a PACT pharmacist; the court found no “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence” giving rise to an inference of age or gender discrimination; even assuming arguendo that plaintiffs’ reassignment to the float pool constitutes a prima facie retaliation case, plaintiffs presented no evidence that the Bay Pines’ legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the reassignment was pretextual; plaintiffs' remaining retaliation claims also failed; and plaintiffs’ evidence does not amount to an actionable hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Trask v. Secretary, Dept. of VA" on Justia Law

Two off-regular-duty Miami-Dade police officers were moonlighting by providing "police services" to a local bar and nightclub, Blue Martini. The officers got into an altercation with two individuals, Gustavo and Elsa Martinez, and arrested them. The Martinezes filed suit against the officers, as well as Miami-Dade and Blue Martini. The Martinezes' claims have been settled or resolved. In this appeal, Blue Martini challenged the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the County on the County’s indemnification claim against Blue Martini. Blue Martini claims for the first time on appeal that Fla. Stat. 30.2905 - which makes a private employer responsible for the acts or omissions of the deputy sheriff while performing services for that employer while off duty - wrongfully deprived it of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Because the constitutional question raised is purely a legal one and because the matter is likely to arise again, the court exercised its discretion to entertain the claim. The court held that Fla. Stat. 30.2905 reasonably serves a variety of legitimate governmental interests, easily passes rational basis scrutiny, and, therefore, does not violate the due process clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blue Martini Kendall, LLC v. Miami Dade Cnty." on Justia Law