Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Brooks and Smith, bail enforcement agents, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against various defendants after they were removed from a court room by a courtroom marshal at the request of a judge. The court concluded that neither precedent nor first principles justify giving courtroom officials absolute immunity when they allegedly use force in excess of what their judge commanded and the Constitution allows. In this case, the marshal was not performing a judicial function and he employed more force than the judge ordered him to use. The court concluded, however, that the marshal was entitled to a qualified immunity defense. Given the chaos in the courtroom and the undisputed evidence that Brooks was intent on disobeying the court’s instructions - and given his extremely vague and insubstantial allegations about his injury - it is simply not “beyond debate” that the marshal employed an unreasonable amount of force. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the marshal's absolute immunity defense and reversed the district court's denial of his qualified immunity defense. View "Brooks v. Clark County" on Justia Law

When plaintiff testified at her son's trial, LA County Deputy District Attorney Michele Hanisee published all of plaintiff's medical records that she had subpoenaed from Kaiser without redacting them for the sole purpose of discrediting plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint pro se for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law causes of action against Kaiser and Hanisee, as well as County Defendants. The district court dismissed all causes of action against the County Defendants with prejudice and against Kaiser without prejudice. The court concluded that defendants Hanisee and Cooley are not entitled to absolute immunity for Hanisee’s misrepresentations in her declaration supporting the application for the subpoena duces tecum; the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff leave to amend her section 1983 claim against the County; and the County Defendants are not entitled to the claimed state statutory immunity because the claims against them are not malicious prosecution claims. Because the court reversed the dismissal of certain federal claims, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of state law claims against Kaiser. View "Garmon v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was charged with two counts of child endangerment under Or. Rev. Stat. 163.575 after officers smelled the odor of marijuana from her home but she refused to allow them to search inside the residence. Plaintiff argued that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by entering her carport and approaching her home’s back door. The trial court agreed and granted plaintiff's motion to suppress. The charges were later dropped. Plaintiff then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the officers and the City, alleging constitutional violations for false arrest without probable cause and by interfering with her (and her children's) right to familial association. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court joined other federal courts of appeal and held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in section 1983 cases, and rejected plaintiff's suggestion that probable cause to arrest may be supported only by information that was obtained in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the officers’ unlawful entry into her home’s curtilage necessarily tainted the arrest that followed. In this case, plaintiff gives no reason to doubt that the officers indeed smelled what they suspected to be marijuana. Such odor gave the officers probable cause to arrest plaintiff under Oregon law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lingo v. City of Salem" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Wiccan, petitioned on behalf of himself and some thirty fellow Wiccan inmates that the prison recognize Wicca as a bona fide religion and afford its followers the same rights accorded to inmates of other faiths. The parties entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement (the 1997 Agreement). The parties subsequently entered into another settlement agreement, which the district court adopted as a consent decree (2011 Decree). The decree reaffirmed the promises the CDC made in the 1997 Agreement and provided plaintiff with additional privileges. At issue on appeal is the district court's decision to terminate the consent decree based on defendants' substantial compliance. The court accorded no special deference in reviewing the district court's exercise of discretion when the district court had supervised the consent decree only two years of the twenty-year history of the case. The court concluded that the district court committed numerous errors in terminating a consent decree that had been carefully crafted over the course of two decades; the district court applied the wrong legal standard and found substantial compliance without giving due attention to the various exacting obligations embodied in the decree, and without considering whether the purpose of the decree had been served; the district court improvidently refused to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve material factual disputes about whether defendants had complied with the decree; and the district court also encouraged noncompliance by finding that defendants had violated the consent decree, yet refusing to grant any meaningful relief. The court held that under no circumstances should the district court consider terminating a decree unless and until there has been a substantial period of substantial compliance - in this case no less than a year - with every one of its terms. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order and reinstated the 2011 consent decree, remanding for further proceedings. View "Rouser v. White" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that they prevented him from collecting on a California state court legal malpractice judgment. The district court granted Defendant Hummer's motion to strike plaintiff's claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court's order is not a "final decision" over which the court may exercise appellate jurisdiction. Under the Erie doctrine, it is long since settled that federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Rule 54(b), which the court must apply, clearly states that the order on appeal here is not final. The court also concluded that the grant of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. View "Hyan v. Hummer" on Justia Law

ASA filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Board, alleging that the Board modified its policies to retaliate against the ASA's exercise of its First Amendment free speech rights. The ASA alleged that the Board's retaliatory policy change caused it harm by chilling students’ political speech and depriving the ASA of its income. The district court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. The court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars any claim by the ASA for retrospective relief, including money damages, against the Board. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred when it failed to apply Ex Parte Young to the ASA’s claim of ongoing First Amendment retaliation, and its request for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief. In this case, the ASA properly alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim, and it identified the Board's changes to its fee-collection policies as the sources of ongoing violations of federal law within the meaning of Young and its progeny. The court also concluded that the district court erred when it dismissed the suit with prejudice on futility grounds. In this case, the ASA adequately and plainly pleaded a plausible claim for First Amendment retaliation on the basis that the Board deprived it of a valuable government benefit. The collection and remittance of funds is a valuable government benefit, and a change in policy undertaken for retaliatory purposes that results in the deprivation of those funds implicates the First Amendment. Finally, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to grant the ASA leave to amend its complaint to conform with the requirements of Young. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Arizona Students' Ass'n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents" on Justia Law

The defeated faction of the Tribe filed suit arguing that the Department erred in several of its decisions related to choosing the leadership authority for the Tribe by failing to comply with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that the Tribe’s recent adoption of a new constitution moots this appeal. Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to deciding live cases or controversies. This rule forecloses the court's ability to reach the merits in this case, because there is no chance that a remand to the Bureau of Indian Affairs would make any difference whatsoever. View "Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. USDOI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a civil-service employee at a naval base, filed a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics action after he was involved in a budgetary investigation against base administrators for employment-related due process and First Amendment violations. Plaintiff also filed suit against the investigator for Fourth Amendment violations. The court held that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., precludes employment-related Bivens claims by Non-Appropriated Fund Instrumentality Program (NAFI) employees like plaintiff, for whom Congress has provided other safeguards. The court also concluded that plaintiff suffered no Fourth Amendment violation because he impliedly consented to the storage of his belongings by voluntarily passing through an internal checkpoint in a passage-restricted military installation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment and dismissal of the complaint. View "Farkas v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the City and police officers, alleging various claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and California law. The officers were responding to a report that two armed black males had been seen in the parking lot of an apartment complex. The officers, eventually numbering over twenty, were armed with assault rifles. There was no one meeting the description of the report at the scene, only a large Samoan family celebrating a little girl's birthday. The officers detained the family, searched them for weapons, and searched the family's apartment without a warrant or consent. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction to consider the appeal, but its jurisdiction is limited to deciding only the question whether, taking all the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The court concluded that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for the seizure of the three teenage boys, for the seizure of Sialoi Sialoi Jr., for the seizure of the remaining plaintiffs, and for the warrantless search of the apartment. Because defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, the district court properly denied their motion for summary judgment. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Sialoi v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against CCA under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that CCA staffed the Idaho Corrections Center (ICC) with an inadequate number of security guards, in deliberate indifference to the health and safety of prisoners. After the parties settled, CCA agreed to staff ICC with a specified number of security personnel. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The district court subsequently held CCA in contempt for falsifying staffing reports, ordered remedial measures, and awarded plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs. The court concluded that the district court had ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, the terms of which were incorporated into the district court’s dismissal order. The court also concluded that the extension of the settlement agreement is a compensatory civil sanction. Rather than punishing CCA, this sanction sought to return plaintiffs as nearly as possible to the position they would have occupied had CCA not violated the agreement. By extending the settlement agreement for two years, the district court thus ordered the relief to which plaintiffs were originally entitled under the agreement but that CCA had failed to provide. The court concluded that the remedies remain narrowly drawn, necessary, and the least intrusive means to rectify CCA’s continued Eighth Amendment violations. In regard to attorney's fees, the court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626, allows enhancement of the lodestar figure in appropriate circumstances; while the PLRA limits the hours and the hourly rate used in calculating the lodestar figure, it does not cap the total amount of attorney’s fees awards in cases seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and it continues to authorize a court to enhance the lodestar figure based on non-subsumed factors; and even when an enhancement is appropriate it may not be based on considerations already subsumed in the PLRA rate. In this case, the district court provided clear reasons, supported by specific evidence in the record, for enhancing the lodestar figure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the contempt order and the order awarding attorney's fees. View "Kelly v. Wengler" on Justia Law