Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury of child molestation after he helped bathe young girls who were in his and his wife’s care through the foster system. The relevant Arizona statute defined child molestation as any direct or indirect touching of a child’s private parts, and, at the time, allowed a defendant to raise an affirmative defense by proving he was not motivated by sexual interest. The petitioner admitted to the touching but argued he lacked sexual motivation.After his first trial ended in a mistrial, the Arizona Supreme Court decided State v. Holle, which held that sexual motivation was not an element of the crime and that the lack of sexual interest was an affirmative defense the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. At the petitioner’s second trial, the court instructed the jury accordingly, and he was convicted on some counts. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Holle, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the statutory scheme unconstitutionally shifted the burden of disproving an essential element of the crime to him. The district court denied relief, finding the state courts’ application of federal law was not objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Arizona’s statutory scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving sexual motivation, which is the critical fact distinguishing criminal from innocent conduct. The court concluded that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the conviction was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "BIEGANSKI V. SHINN" on Justia Law

A religious association that supports abortion as part of its core beliefs challenged Idaho’s laws criminalizing abortion. The association, which operates a telehealth abortion clinic in New Mexico, claimed to have members in Idaho who would be affected by the abortion bans. However, it did not have any patients in Idaho, no clinic or doctors licensed to practice in Idaho, and could not identify any Idaho citizen who had sought or would imminently seek an abortion through the organization. The association argued that Idaho’s laws harmed its members and frustrated its mission, and that it had diverted resources to open its New Mexico clinic in response to abortion bans in Idaho and other states.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the association lacked both associational and organizational standing. The court also addressed the merits of the association’s constitutional claims and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the grounds of lack of Article III standing. The appellate court held that the association failed to show associational standing because it did not identify any specific member who had suffered or would imminently suffer an injury due to Idaho’s abortion laws. The court also found no organizational standing, as the association’s diversion of resources and alleged frustration of its mission were insufficient to establish standing under recent Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims. The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the complaint could be saved by amendment, noting that dismissals for lack of jurisdiction should generally be without prejudice. View "THE SATANIC TEMPLE V. LABRADOR" on Justia Law

A group of individuals and organizations challenged a longstanding policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), codified as Rule 202.5(e), which requires defendants in civil enforcement actions to agree not to publicly deny the allegations against them as a condition of settlement. This “no-deny” provision has been in place since 1972 and is incorporated into settlement agreements, with the SEC’s remedy for a breach being the ability to ask the court to reopen the case. The petitioners argued that this rule violates the First Amendment and was improperly adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).Previously, the New Civil Liberties Alliance (NCLA) petitioned the SEC to amend Rule 202.5(e) to remove the no-deny requirement, citing constitutional concerns. The SEC denied the petition, explaining that defendants can voluntarily waive constitutional rights in settlements and that the rule preserves the agency’s ability to litigate if a defendant later denies the allegations. After the denial, the petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, asserting both First Amendment and APA violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the SEC’s denial. Applying the Supreme Court’s framework from Town of Newton v. Rumery, the court held that voluntary waivers of constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights, are generally permissible if knowing and voluntary. The court concluded that Rule 202.5(e) is not facially invalid under the First Amendment, as it is a limited restriction tied to the settlement context and does not preclude all speech. The court also found that the SEC had statutory authority for the rule, was not required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking, and provided a rational explanation for its decision. The petition for review was denied, but the court left open the possibility of future as-applied challenges. View "POWELL V. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION" on Justia Law

A Christian humanitarian organization offered a remote customer service representative position to an applicant who was openly in a same-sex marriage. After the applicant disclosed her marital status while inquiring about parental leave, the organization rescinded the job offer, citing its policy that limits employment to those who comply with its religious standards, including a prohibition on sexual conduct outside of marriage between a man and a woman. The applicant, who identifies as Christian and is active in LGBTQ advocacy, sued the organization for discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, and marital status under federal and state law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington initially granted summary judgment to the organization, finding that the church autonomy doctrine barred judicial inquiry into the religiously motivated employment decision. Upon reconsideration, the district court reversed itself, holding that the church autonomy doctrine did not apply because the organization’s hiring policy was facially discriminatory and could be evaluated using neutral legal principles. The district court also rejected the organization’s ministerial exception defense and other constitutional and statutory defenses, ultimately granting summary judgment to the applicant and entering judgment for stipulated damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception applies because customer service representatives at the organization perform key religious functions central to its mission, such as communicating its ministries to donors, engaging in prayer with supporters, and inviting participation in its religious mission. The court concluded that these duties are vital to the organization’s religious purpose, and therefore, the ministerial exception bars the applicant’s employment discrimination claims. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the organization. View "MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the owners of the Las Vegas Review-Journal and the Las Vegas Sun regarding a 2005 joint operating arrangement (JOA). The 2005 JOA amended a 1989 JOA, which had been approved by the U.S. Attorney General under the Newspaper Preservation Act (NPA). The NPA allows failing newspapers to combine operations with another newspaper while maintaining editorial independence, provided they receive prior written consent from the Attorney General. The 2005 JOA was not approved by the Attorney General.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied the defendants' motion to dissolve a stipulated injunction that required them to continue performing under the 2005 JOA. The district court concluded that the Attorney General's approval was not necessary for the 2005 JOA to be enforceable, interpreting the NPA as only denying antitrust exemption without invalidating the JOA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 2005 JOA is unlawful and unenforceable under the NPA because it did not receive the required prior written consent from the Attorney General. The court clarified that the language of the NPA is clear and unequivocal, declaring unapproved JOAs to be unlawful to enter into, perform, or enforce. The court also rejected the district court's interpretation that the lack of approval merely meant the parties lacked antitrust exemption. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "LAS VEGAS SUN, INC. V. ADELSON" on Justia Law

The case involves an executive order issued by President Trump, which excluded over 40 federal agencies and subdivisions from collective bargaining requirements, citing national security concerns. The plaintiffs, six unions representing federal employees, argued that the executive order constituted First Amendment retaliation, was ultra vires, violated Fifth Amendment procedural due process, abrogated contractual property rights, and violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment.The Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction against the executive order, focusing on the First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court found that the plaintiffs had raised serious questions about whether the order was retaliatory, citing statements from a White House Fact Sheet that criticized federal unions. The court concluded that the balance of hardships and public interest favored the plaintiffs, as the order threatened union operations and collective bargaining rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government's request for an emergency stay of the district court's preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit granted the stay, finding that the government was likely to succeed on the merits of the retaliation claim. The court concluded that the executive order and the accompanying Fact Sheet demonstrated a focus on national security, and that the President would have issued the order regardless of the plaintiffs' protected conduct. The court also found that the government would suffer irreparable harm without a stay, as the injunction impeded the government's ability to manage national security-related functions. The court determined that the public interest favored granting the stay to preserve the President's authority in national security matters. View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Trump" on Justia Law

During a protest in Seattle on June 7-8, 2020, Taylor Cheairs was filming the event when Officer Anderson of the Seattle Police Department (SPD) threw a blast ball grenade that exploded and struck Cheairs in the groin, causing serious injury. Cheairs sued the City of Seattle, the SPD, and unnamed officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because Cheairs was not seized, and no First Amendment violation because there was no evidence of retaliation. The court also ruled that without a constitutional violation, there could be no municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that although a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Cheairs was seized when Officer Anderson struck him with the blast ball, the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. The court noted that the protesters near Cheairs posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers, citizens, and property. The court also held that Cheairs failed to establish a viable First Amendment retaliation claim because he did not provide evidence that his filming was a substantial or motivating factor in the use of force against him. Consequently, without a viable constitutional claim, Cheairs could not establish a claim for municipal liability. View "CHEAIRS V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

A physician instructor of continuing medical education (CME) courses and a nonprofit organization challenged the Medical Board of California's requirement that CME courses eligible for credit include information about implicit bias. They argued that this requirement violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, holding that CME courses eligible for credit constitute government speech and are therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. The court noted that the plaintiffs could choose not to instruct CME courses for credit or address their grievances through the democratic process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court applied the factors set forth in Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 596 U.S. 243 (2022), to determine whether the CME courses were government speech. The court found that California has a longstanding tradition of regulating the medical profession, the public would likely attribute CME speech to the government rather than to CME instructors, and California controls the content of CME courses and imposes several restrictions on their form and delivery. Therefore, the court held that CME courses eligible for credit by the Medical Board of California are government speech and are immune from the strictures of the Free Speech Clause. The court's decision was based on the holistic inquiry into the history, public perception, and extent of government control over the expression. View "Khatbi v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 63, which established a background check regime for ammunition sales. This regime, effective from July 1, 2019, requires residents to purchase ammunition through licensed vendors in face-to-face transactions and mandates background checks before each purchase. The plaintiffs, including Olympic shooter Kim Rhode and several other individuals and organizations, challenged this regime on Second Amendment grounds, arguing it infringes on their right to keep and bear arms.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the ammunition background check provisions. After the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen, the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the district court consolidated the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits and permanently enjoined California from enforcing the ammunition background check provisions, concluding they violated the Second Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit applied the two-step framework from Bruen, determining that California's ammunition background check regime implicates the plain text of the Second Amendment and that the government failed to show the regime is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court held that the regime meaningfully constrains the right to keep operable arms and does not survive scrutiny under the Bruen analysis. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a permanent injunction against the enforcement of California's ammunition background check regime. View "Rhode v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Jessica Bates, a devout Christian and widowed mother of five, applied to adopt children through the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS). Her application was denied because she could not comply with Oregon Administrative Rule § 413-200-0308(2)(k), which requires prospective adoptive parents to "respect, accept, and support" the sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression of children. Bates objected to using preferred pronouns and taking children to medical appointments for gender transitions, citing her religious beliefs. She sued, claiming the policy violated her First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied Bates's motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The court found that the policy was neutral and generally applicable, thus subject to rational basis review, which it survived. The court also concluded that the policy, as applied to Bates, compelled and restricted speech based on content and viewpoint, triggering strict scrutiny. However, it held that the policy was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in protecting LGBTQ children.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Oregon's application of § 413-200-0308(2)(k) to Bates triggered strict scrutiny for both her free speech and free exercise claims. The court found that the policy restricted and compelled speech based on content and viewpoint and was not neutral or generally applicable. The court concluded that Oregon's policy was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, as less restrictive means were available to protect LGBTQ children. The court remanded the case with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining ODHS from applying the rule to Bates in deeming her ineligible for certification as an adoptive parent. View "Bates v. Pakseresht" on Justia Law