Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Sarah Weeden was convicted in California state court of felony murder and sentenced to twenty-nine years to life in prison for her role in a bungled robbery that occurred when she was fourteen. She was not present at the scene of the crime; the prosecution’s case rested on evidence of her role in planning and facilitating the robbery. Weeden’s defense at trial consisted entirely of four character witnesses. Trial counsel did not seek an evaluation by a psychologist or present expert testimony about the effect of Weeden’s youth on her mental state. In post-trial proceedings, counsel claimed that he did not obtain an evaluation because the result might not support his defense strategy. In her habeas corpus petition, Weeden claimed that her trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. The state courts rejected this claim, finding that counsel’s refusal to investigate psychological testimony was a reasonable strategic decision. The district court denied habeas relief; the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court concluded that had an expert's testimony been presented to the jury, "the probability of a different result is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" View "Weeden v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Donald “Ski” Johnson of wire fraud. The district court sentenced Johnson to five years’ probation and ordered Johnson to pay $5,648.58 in restitution. On appeal, the government argued the district court erred by considering only Johnson’s fraudulent conduct that occurred in Montana (the count of conviction) when determining restitution, and thus misinterpreted the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (“MVRA”). After review, the Ninth Circuit agreed, vacated the district court’s restitution order and remanded for determination of whether Johnson’s conduct outside of Montana was related to his scheme to defraud. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

California state prisoner Kevin Andres appealed pro se the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging excessive force. After prison staff failed to respond to plaintiff’s grievance alleging excessive force, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court regarding his attempt to exhaust the claim. While the state court action was pending, plaintiff filed this action alleging that administrative remedies were unavailable because officials failed to process his grievance. Subsequently, the state habeas court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the habeas petition, finding that plaintiff had timely filed a grievance and ordering that the grievance be accepted and processed. The district court subsequently dismissed the excessive force claim, finding that exhaustion was not complete at the time plaintiff filed this action. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. Under the circumstances present here, Andres exhausted his available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. "When prison officials fail to respond to a prisoner’s grievance within a reasonable time, the prisoner is deemed to have exhausted available administrative remedies within the meaning of the [Prison Litigation Reform Act]." View "Andres v. Marshall" on Justia Law

A City of Berkeley ordinance required cell phone retailers to inform prospective cell phone purchasers that carrying a cell phone in certain ways may cause them to exceed Federal Communications Commission guidelines for exposure to radio-frequency radiation. CTIA, a trade association, challenged the ordinance on two grounds: (1) the ordinance violated the First Amendment; and (2) the ordinance was preempted. CTIA requested a preliminary injunction staying enforcement of the ordinance. The district court denied CTIA’s request, and CTIA filed an interlocutory appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. View "CTIA Witeless Ass'n v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

Defendant Raymond Fryberg, Jr., appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. He argued several grounds for reversal, including the allegedly erroneous admission into evidence of a return of service that the Government used to prove that Defendant had been served with notice of a hearing on a domestic violence protection order. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the admission of the return of service did not violate either the rule against hearsay or the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction. View "United States v. Fryberg, Jr." on Justia Law

In 2015, Hugo Rivera-Muniz pleaded guilty to reentering the United States without authorization after having been deported or removed. At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered Rivera-Muniz’s previous conviction for voluntary manslaughter under California Penal Code section 192(a) and concluded that it was an enumerated crime of violence that triggered a 16-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). However, the district court also applied a 7-level downward variance, thus sentencing Rivera-Muniz to twenty-seven months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Rivera-Muniz challenged the 16-level enhancement, arguing that California Penal Code section 192(a) was not categorically a crime of violence. Finding no error in the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Rivera-Muniz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joann Davis and Paul Cilley filed suit against the United States and NASA officials, alleging, among other things, a claim for wrongful detention under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents. The court concluded that the federal agent involved in the detention was not entitled to qualified immunity from suit for detaining Davis, an elderly woman, in a public parking lot for two hours, while she stood in urine-soaked pants, to question her, incident to a search, about her possession of a paperweight containing a rice-grain-sized bit of lunar material. The court agreed with Davis that, in light of Franklin v. Foxworth, the agent violated the Fourth Amendment because his detention of her was unreasonably prolonged and degrading. In this case, the agent was aware of several facts that color the reasonableness of his actions: he knew that Davis was a slight, elderly woman; Davis had lost control of her bladder and had visibly wet her pants; Davis and Cilley were unarmed and the search warrant had been fully executed; Davis had not concealed possession of the paperweights, but rather had reached out to NASA for help in selling the paperweights; and the agent knew that Davis was experiencing financial distress as a result of having to raise grandchildren after her daughter died, her son was severely ill and required expensive medical care, and Davis needed a transplant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. View "Davis v. United States" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute over which California government entity would be responsible for funding the education of K.G. pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A). The School District contended that the district court erred in granting K.G. relief from its original judgment denying attorneys' fees. The court concluded that the district court did not apply the incorrect legal rule in evaluating whether to grant relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) where the district court's determination that K.G.'s delay in pursuing Rule 60(b) relief was understandable in light of the original attorney's poor mental and physical health; K.G. was the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees because K.G.'s prayer was answered in full when the ALJ designated the School District as the responsible agency and granted K.G.'s requested relief; K.G. qualified as a prevailing party under the IDEA, and this victory was not trivial or merely technical; but it was not clear from the district court's award that it took into account forgoing considerations in reducing the fees originally requested. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Irvine Unified School District v. K.G." on Justia Law

The court filed an amended opinion reversing in part and affirming in part the denial of habeas relief, and order denying a petition for rehearing en banc. Petitioner, convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court concluded that the relevant state court decision, relating to petitioner's claims regarding (1) the use of a leg brace as a security measure during trial; (2) the use of dual juries; (3) juror bias; (4) counsel's performance during the plea process; and (5) counsel's performance during the penalty phase, was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts before that court. The court concluded, however, that the Arizona Supreme Court applied a "causal nexus” test, whereby not all mitigating evidence was considered under Lockett v. Ohio, Eddings v. Oklahoma, and their progeny. Consequently, this decision was contrary to established federal law and the court reversed, remanding with instructions to grant the petition with respect to petitioner's sentence. View "Hedlund v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims arising out of injuries he sustained while he was housed in the county jail. On appeal, the county and Conmed, a private contractor, challenged the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. Plaintiff argued that the applicable statute of limitations was tolled under RCW 4.96.020. The court held that RCW 4.96.020 is a special statute of limitations as opposed to a typical tolling provision, and thus it is not applicable to claims filed under section 1983. Therefore, the court found that plaintiff filed his federal complaint after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired, and that his section 1983 claims were thus time-barred. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the section 1983 claims. View "Boston v. Kitsap County" on Justia Law