Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

About a decade ago, Holt was convicted of possessing a firearm despite prior convictions that barred gun ownership, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court deemed him an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and imposed a 200-month sentence, counting a burglary conviction as one of his three prior violent felonies. Without that enhancement, Holt’s maximum sentence would have been 120 months. After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause in 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague, Holt challenged his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his petition. While Holt’s appeal was pending the Seventh Circuit held that the version of the Illinois burglary statute under which he was convicted is not a “violent felony” because it does not satisfy the definition of “burglary” used for indivisible statutes. The court acknowledged that the holdings apply retroactively, but noted that this is Holt’s second section 2255 proceeding. A successive collateral attack is permissible only if the court of appeals certifies that it rests on newly discovered evidence or “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” His current argument rests on a Seventh Circuit precedent and on a decision that has not been declared retroactive by the Supreme Court and is not a new rule of constitutional law. Holt’s claim depends on the meaning of “burglary” rather than the meaning of the Constitution. View "Holt v. United States" on Justia Law

Brunson purchased the only liquor store in Bridgeport, Illinois. Bridgeport Police Chief Murray was a frequent visitor and often told Brunson that he was violating liquor laws that did not actually exist. Once, Bridgeport Mayor Schauf, also the local liquor commissioner, “confirmed” a non-existent law. Schauf had made a competing offer to purchase the store and had an interest another alcohol-serving establishment by subterfuge. Schauf’s son opened another Bridgeport bar. In 2010, Brunson applied to renew his liquor license weeks before it would expire. A licensee with no violations is entitled to pro forma renewal. Chief Murray told Bronson to hire a lawyer; Schauf told Brunson that he would not renew the license in time. Brunson had to close his business, hired counsel, and contacted the state Commission, which ordered that Brunson be allowed to remain open pending a hearing. Brunson’s liquor supplier then was told by the city clerk to not sell to Brunson. Before the Commission’s scheduled hearing, Schauf retroactively renewed the license without explanation. Subsequently Brunson discovered an attempted break-in; Murray did not file a report. The following weekend, the store was vandalized and the police took no action. Brunson stood guard the next weekend. During the night, the store’s windows were shattered. Bronson found Harshman—a convicted felon, and occasional employee at Schauf’s businesses. After a fight and a chase, Bronson held Harshman at gunpoint until police arrived. Brunson pointed out Schauf’s son waiting nearby. Brunson was charged with felony aggravated battery. Brunson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the prosecutor, based on absolute prosecutorial immunity, and with respect to false arrest. The court reversed summary judgment on Brunson’s class-of-one equal protection claim and for Schauf, who is not entitled to absolute immunity on Brunson’s due process claim. View "Brunson v. Murray" on Justia Law

Lewisbey purchased guns at Indiana gun shows with a fake I.D., sold them in Illinois, and boasted about it on Facebook. Federal agents began an undercover operation. After Lewisbey sold a total of 43 guns to a confidential informant in five separate controlled purchases, he was charged with unlawful dealing in firearms without a license, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A); illegally transporting firearms across state lines, sections 922(a)(3), 924(a)(1)(D); and traveling across state lines with intent to engage in unlicensed dealing of firearms, section 924(n). Lewisbey was represented by Attorney Brindley, who was facing a criminal contempt proceeding. Questioned by the judge about the potential conflict of interest, Lewisbey expressly waived any conflict and consented to Brindley’s continuation as his counsel. Lewisbey was convicted and sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment. The government subsequently obtained a limited remand to address a new criminal investigation targeting Brindley. Brindley withdrew. Another attorney took over Lewisbey’s appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of violation of Lewisbey’s Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel; that the Facebook posts and text messages taken from his phones should have been excluded on hearsay and authentication grounds or based on prejudicial impact under Federal Rule 403; and that the government’s cell-phone location expert did not satisfy the “Daubert” factors. View "United States v. Lewisbey" on Justia Law

In 2004, Nelms retained Katz-Crank, a Michigan lawyer with a practice in cemetery management, to assist in his acquisition of cemeteries and funeral homes in Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. Trust funds associated with these cemeteries were valued at about $22 million. In 2007 Katz‐Crank learned that Nelms was under investigation by the Indiana Secretary of State for misappropriating cemetery trust assets. Katz‐Crank called Haskett, an investigator in that office, to offer cooperation. Haskett did not return the call. In 2008, Nelms was indicted for embezzling $22 million, pleaded guilty, and agreed to testify against Katz‐Crank. Haskett called some of Katz‐Crank’s clients and stated that Katz‐Crank was under criminal investigation. The Secretary of State and the Marion County prosecutor’s office issued press releases publicizing Katz-Crank’s arrest. A jury acquitted Katz‐Crank. Two years later Katz‐Crank sued Marion County and officials who were involved in her investigation and prosecution, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, with three federal conspiracy claims and state‐law claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district judge rejected all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Most of Katz‐Crank’s claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment or prosecutorial immunity; the rest were properly dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim. View "Katz-Crank v. Haskett" on Justia Law

The petitioners sought to place on the ballot a proposition that, if approved by the voters, would impose mayoral term limits. If approved, the proposition would prevent the incumbent mayor from running for reelection. The County Clerk refused to place the proposition on the ballot because Calumet City’s current administration already had placed three propositions on the ballot. State law, 10 ILCS 5/28‐1, permitted no more than three propositions in any single election. The administration’s ballot initiatives appeared to target specifically Alderman Jones, who had announced he was running for mayor. Jones and the petitioners sought injunctive relief, claiming violations of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Illinois Constitution. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The request for injunctive relief was not timely and considerable harm would have been visited on the electoral system if the requested relief had been granted. There was evidence that the petitioners knew that the statute displaced their ballot initiative by the end of June, but delayed in filing suit until September 15. Jones’s individual claims were not ripe; Jones could not challenge the constitutionality of the propositions unless they were enacted by the referendum process. View "Jones v. Qualkinbush" on Justia Law

Yates was sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) in 2003. The district court concluded that he had six qualifying prior convictions; the statute provides that three or more require an enhanced sentence. After the Supreme Court held in 2015 that the “residual clause” in section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague, and made the decision retroactive, Yates argued that he had only two qualifying convictions. The prosecutor conceded that the petition was timely under 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3) and that three of Yates’s convictions were disqualified, but argued that Yates’s conviction of battery by a prisoner (Wis. Stat. 940.20(1)), qualifies as a violent felony under the “elements clause” of 924(e)(2)(B)(i) because it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” against a person. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The elements of the offense, not the facts of the crime, control. The Wisconsin statute provided: Any prisoner … who intentionally causes bodily harm to an officer, employee, visitor or another inmate … is guilty of a Class D felony.” Section 939.22(4) added that bodily harm means “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” The described offense categorically is a crime of violence under the elements clause. View "Yates v. United States" on Justia Law

Haywood, an inmate at Illinois’s Shawnee Correctional Center, accused a teacher of attacking him. Guards charged him with making false statements. A disciplinary panel found him guilty, ordered him transferred to segregation for two months, and revoked one month of good‐time credit. He was subsequently transferred to a different prison and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment violations and that his conditions of confinement in segregation were cruel and unusual, violating the Eighth Amendment. The district court rejected both claims, dismissing the First Amendment claim because the disciplinary panel’s decision, which affected the duration of Haywood’s confinement, had not been set aside on collateral review or by executive clemency. The court cited Supreme Court holdings that section 1983 cannot be used to seek damages when relief necessarily implies the invalidity of a criminal conviction or prison discipline that remains in force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the First Amendment theory and reversed with respect to the Eighth Amendment theory, remanding for consideration under the deliberate indifference standard.The warden had actual knowledge of the unusually harsh weather, had been apprised of the specific problem with Haywood’s cell (the windows would not shut), and had toured the segregation unit. View "Haywood v. Hathaway" on Justia Law

Patrick, on parole, did not comply with the conditions of his release from state prison. A warrant issued for his arrest. Milwaukee police obtained a second warrant, which authorized them to locate Patrick using cell‐phone data. Police arrested him in a car, on a public street, in possession of a firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress evidence of the gun, rejecting Patrick’s challenge to the validity of the location‐tracking warrant, in which he argued that his person was not contraband nor the proceeds of a crime, so that it was off limits to investigation. The court noted that no warrant was required. Patrick was visible to the general public. The court noted that, under recent Supreme Court precedent, even if the police had stopped Patrick’s car for no reason and later learned that he was a fugitive, the gun would have been admissible. The officers who arrested Patrick had both probable cause to believe that he was a fugitive and knowledge of the arrest warrant. The court discussed the use of a cell-site simulator, which potentially reveals information about many persons other than the suspect, but stated that a “fugitive cannot be picky about how he is run to ground.” View "United States v. Patrick" on Justia Law

In 1997, Rodriguez was convicted of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to 60 years in prison. The Illinois State Police’s Division of Forensic Services had analyzed four semen stains on a blanket from the bed of the 11-year-old victim. Neither side presented the report at trial. The victim’s mother testified that Rodriquez had indicated he was “up all night” doing laundry; during closing arguments the prosecutor asked whether that might be “to get rid of evidence.” Objecting to the statement, in the presence of the jury, defense counsel stated “In fact, counsel knows that there was sperm on various items that was not presented.” The judge instructed the jury to consider only evidence admitted during trial. On direct appeal, Rodriguez argued, that he was denied effective assistance by the comment about evidence of sperm being found on “various items.” The Illinois Appellate Court denied relief, concluding that Rodriguez had not been prejudiced. The district court denied a subsequent federal habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the state court did not unreasonable the standard from Strickland v. Washington, in light of the other evidence and the judge’s curative instruction. View "Rodriguez v. Gossett" on Justia Law

While conducting surveillance, based on information about a cocaine transaction, agents followed Bausley to a Chicago apartment building. Bausley parked on the street. Thompson came out wearing a backpack and entered Bausley’s car. Bausley drove around the block and again stopped outside the building. Thompson got out and reentered the building. Agents who saw Thompson communicated with agent Reynolds, who was present but could not see Thompson. Reynolds eventually approached Thompson, who had returned to the lobby from the ninth floor without the backpack. Thompson repeatedly denied living in the building but allowed Reynolds to use his keys. Reynolds used Thompson’s key to open unit 902. Inside the apartment, Reynolds again told Thompson that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to talk to the agents. Thompson signed a consent form, then stated that there was a gun in the TV stand and that there were drugs and cash elsewhere in the apartment. The agents recovered the gun, a kilogram of cocaine, and $10,000 in cash. Thompson was not arrested and agreed to cooperate. Days later, when Thompson stopped answering calls, he was arrested. Thompson was indicted for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Thompson’s motion to suppress; the agents did not commit any violations of Thompson’s Fourth Amendment rights that could have tainted his consent to search his apartment. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law