Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Delatorre was a member of the Insane Deuces street gang. Rivera, a gang member acting as a confidential informant, recorded several meetings and conversations, providing evidence of at least four murders, 11 attempted murders, two solicitations to commit murder, several shootings, and numerous drug offenses. Delatorre was arrested and confessed to involvement in at least three murders. He was convicted of engaging in racketeering conspiracy; murder in aid of racketeering activity; conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance; assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering activity; distribution of crack cocaine; and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. He was sentenced to life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Delatorre moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255), arguing, based on his cooperation with authorities, that the prosecutor committed misconduct by reneging on a promise to provide a plea agreement and ineffective assistance by pretrial counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, finding the prosecutorial misconduct claim procedurally defaulted because it was not raised in the district court or on direct appeal. Delatorre failed to meet the cause‐and-prejudice standard to overcome procedural default. Delatorre’s pretrial counsel was not deficient and Delatorre suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel’s performance. View "Delatorre v. United States" on Justia Law

A patrolman stopped a car hauler on a New Mexico highway because a digit on its license plate was unreadable. The officer noticed that a car, secured on the trailer, lacked a license plate. He asked to see its paperwork. The bill of lading showed that the car was being shipped from California to “Juan Pablo” in Indianapolis. The officer checked the VIN, determined that it was not owned by the shipper or receiver, became suspicious of drug trafficking, and received the driver's permission to search the locked vehicle. The officer found 46 pounds of methamphetamine in a hidden compartment below the console. The hauler conducted a controlled delivery to the Indianapolis address. Covarrubias arrived, paid the driver, and drove the car away. Police arrested him. Covarrubias waived his Miranda rights and acknowledged that he paid the driver, that he knew that the car contained methamphetamine, and that he was being paid $2,000 to deliver the car to an associate. A jury convicted Covarrubias under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, finding that Covarrubias lacked standing because he did not have any expectation of privacy in the vehicle. He had no apparent ownership or possessory right, as either the shipper or receiver and no expectation of privacy after it was turned over to the hauler, which had a key and permission to drive the car on and off the trailer. View "United States v. Covarrubias" on Justia Law

In 2008, Wenger was murdered after trying to buy drugs. Bullet casings were found near Wenger’s body, but not other physical evidence was recovered. Investigators relied on information from community members and from incarcerated individuals. Weeks after the murder, the state charged Brown, then 13 years old, and Love, 19 years old. Brown was waived into adult felony court; the two were tried together. The state’s key evidence was the testimony of Morris that, while Morris, Brown, and Love were all in the Elkhart County Jail, Brown and Love each confessed separately to involvement in the murder. Both were convicted. After exhausting state court remedies, Brown filed a federal habeas petition, claiming he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to insist that the judge give the limiting instruction required when evidence of a co-defendant’s out-of-court confession is introduced in a joint trial. The court concluded that Brown had procedurally defaulted that claim by failing to assert it in state court. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Brown is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and could overcome procedural default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim by demonstrating ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel and asserting a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. View "Brown v. Brown" on Justia Law

Tatum was charged with two counts of first-degree intentional homicide by use of a dangerous weapon. The case was set for a jury trial on November 29, 2010. On August 12, at Tatum’s request, counsel moved to withdraw. Lawyer 2 was subsequently allowed to withdraw. The court reset the date for January 31, 2011 for Tatum’s third lawyer, Erickson. On January 18, Erickson requested a competence evaluation. After an in-patient exam, the report concluded that Tatum was competent to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense, but was likely to be “an extremely challenging defendant.” Tatum asked the court to dismiss Erickson, stating that she was working with the state and not investigating his case to his standards. Tatum refused to meet with Erickson because of counsel’s competence challenge. Tatum stated that he wished to represent himself. After engaging in a colloquy with Tatum, the court denied his request, stating that Tatum’s limited education would make it difficult for him to understand the difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation, and refused to dismiss Erickson. Tatum, convicted and sentenced to life in prison, was unsuccessful on direct appeal and in state post-conviction proceedings. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of a federal habeas petition; the Wisconsin courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent when they refused to allow Tatum to represent himself, after questioning Tatum not about his general competence, but about his educational level and understanding of the legal system. View "Tatum v. Foster" on Justia Law

On the day he was moved to a new unit at the Terre Haute prison, Miller told a circulating guard, Rogers, that he had a brain tumor and was entitled to a lower bunk. Rogers replied that Miller must follow his assignment or be put on report . Days later, Miller fell out of the bunk. He was examined in the emergency room, then returned to the prison, where he still had an upper bunk. He again complained to Rogers, but did not follow procedures for obtaining a new bunk assignment. He subsequently fell out of the bunk and broke his back. After surgery, he was temporarily returned to the upper bunk. Contending that he should have been in a lower bunk, Miller sought compensation, naming two defendants, Rogers, and then-warden Marberry. Miller did not seek relief from any physician or nurse, although the prison’s medical department is responsible for deciding who has a medical need for a lower bunk, nor did he sue the guard responsible for making bunk assignments. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that there is a material dispute about what Rogers would have found, had he consulted the database. Inaction following receipt of a complaint about someone else’s conduct is not a source of liability, View "Miller v. Marberry" on Justia Law

In 1998 Maryetta was raped, strangled to death, and left in an abandoned garage. In 2004 Milwaukee police arrested Avery, who was convicted of first-degree homicide. Avery spent six years in prison before DNA evidence proved that a serial killer linked to nine similar homicides was responsible for the murder. Avery alleged that detectives concocted a fake confession and induced jailhouse informants to falsely incriminate him and that the detectives failed to disclose, as required by Brady v. Maryland, impeachment evidence about the informants’ false statements. Avery added a “Monell” claim against the city. The district judge rejected the Brady claims on summary judgment, reasoning that the detectives had no duty to disclose the impeachment evidence because Avery already knew the informants’ statements were false. A jury found two detectives liable for violating Avery’s due-process rights, found the city liable, and awarded $1 million, but the judge invalidated the verdict based on “mixed signals” from the Seventh Circuit on whether an officer’s fabrication of evidence is actionable as a due process violation, and holding that without a constitutional violation by the detectives, Monell liability was not possible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Avery’s due-process claims fall “comfortably within” circuit precedent. That Avery knew the informants’ statements were false did not relieve the detectives of their duty to disclose impeachment evidence. View "Avery v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Indiana’s 2015 Vapor Pens and E-Liquid Act regulates the manufacture and distribution of vapor pens and the liquids used in e-cigarettes, Ind. Code 7.1-7- 1-1. The Act has extraterritorial reach and imposed detailed requirements of Indiana law on out-of-state manufacturing operations. It purported to regulate the design and operation of out-of-state production facilities, including requirements for sinks, cleaning products, and even the details of contracts with outside security firms and the qualifications of those firms’ personnel. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of a challenge to the Act. Imposing these Indiana laws on out-of-state manufacturers violates the dormant Commerce Clause. Indiana has ample authority to regulate in-state commerce in vapor pens, e-liquids, and e-cigarettes to protect the health and safety of its residents, by prohibiting sales to minors and requiring child-proof packaging, ingredient labeling, and purity. The requirements for in-state production facilities pose no inherent constitutional problems. Indiana may not, however, try to achieve its health and safety goals by directly regulating out-of-state factories and commercial transactions. View "Legato Vapors, LLC v. Cook" on Justia Law

A resident of Elkhart’s housing for low-income elderly people and disabled adults was strangled to death. Canen and Royer, recipients of disability benefits, were also residents. They were convicted of felony murder in Indiana state court in 2005. Seven years later, Canen’s conviction was vacated after Chapman, the state’s fingerprint expert, recanted his testimony, conceding that he mistakenly had identified a latent fingerprint found at the crime scene as belonging to Canen. Chapman only was trained to compare “known prints” (i.e., digital, ink, or powder fingerprint exemplars), not “latent prints” (i.e., invisible, unknown fingerprints found at a crime scene), and lacked the necessary qualifications to identify the latent print. He had not disclosed his lack of training in the state proceeding. Canen sued Chapman under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he had withheld his lack of qualification to perform latent fingerprint analysis in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The district court dismissed, holding that Chapman was entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Chapman’s failure to disclose that he was not trained as a latent print examiner is not a violation of any clearly established right, and, to the degree that Canen’s claims are premised on the preparation or presentation of his testimony, absolute immunity protects him. View "Canen v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Illinois’ Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility houses persons adjudged to be sexually violent; many have completed prison sentences for sexually violent acts but are considered too dangerous to be released into the general population. Rushville detainee Hayes alleged deliberate indifference to Hayes’s hydration needs during a five-day “boil order” imposed by the city and applicable to the detention facility. The boil order directed residents to boil tap water before drinking it. The detainees have sinks in their rooms and access to a microwave oven, so Hayes could boil the water from his sink in his microwave. He was also given an eight-ounce carton of milk at each of three daily meals. He nonetheless claimed to have gone without drinkable water for five days, during which time he felt dizzy and dehydrated. The district judge rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that detainees were notified of the order and how to cope with it (by boiling water in their microwave ovens). The facility ordered extra boiled water. The court noted that Hayes did not report feeling dizzy and dehydrated during the boil order: “there can’t be deliberate indifference if the indifferent person did not know what harm he was being indifferent to.” View "Hayes v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 2007, Dr. Eli examined Indiana inmate James, diagnosed his ingrown toenail as infected, ordered antibiotics, and referred him to a foot specialist. A week later, Eli prescribed additional drugs because of continuing pain. A month later, the toenail was removed. The following month, James, who was taking a narcotic for the continuing pain, fell while “hopping up the steps” and hurt his jaw. Thrice he unsuccessfully requested emergency treatment. A month later his jaw “cracked” while he was eating. X‐rays revealed a fractured left mandible. A plastic surgeon, advised against surgery because of the passage of time since the injury. He recommended a soft diet. Two years later, James filed a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference. James, now incarcerated in Arizona, was unable to recruit an attorney or obtain all of his medical records. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the defendants. If a pro se plaintiff in a case like this is unable, despite best efforts, to obtain a lawyer and a medical expert, and if the case would have a chance of success were the plaintiff represented by counsel, the trial judge should endeavor to obtain them for him. It is possible that James has a meritorious Eighth Amendment claim, given his current medical problems, which may be attributable to the injury and lack of adequate medical treatment. View "James v. Eli" on Justia Law