Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Acting under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) the Department of Commerce has maintained a so-called Entity List to restrict designated foreign parties from receiving United States exports.   Plaintiff, Changji Esquel Textile Co, operates a spinning mill in Xinjiang. The United States has determined that China abuses the human rights of Uyghurs and other religious or ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, including imprisonment and forced labor. Changji and its parent company filed a lawsuit alleging that the Department, in adding Changji to the Entity List, violated ECRA and its implementing regulations, the APA, and the Due Process Clause. They moved for a preliminary injunction on the theory that the alleged ECRA and regulatory violations were ultra vires. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on this claim.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to prevail on an ultra vires claim, Plaintiff must establish three things: “(i) the statutory preclusion of review is implied rather than express; (ii) there is no alternative procedure for review of the statutory claim; and (iii) the agency plainly acts in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the statute that is clear and mandatory.   The court explained that the canons invoked by Plaintiffs can resolve statutory ambiguity in close cases, but they do not allow the court to discern any clear and mandatory prohibition on adding entities to the List for human-rights abuses, particularly given the breadth of section 4813(a)(16) and the deference owed to the Executive Branch in matters of foreign affairs. View "Changji Esquel Textile Co. Ltd. v. Gina Raimondo" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Army veteran, arrived at the Tampa International Airport to pick up two of his children who were visiting for the holiday. After a swab of Petitioner’s hands tested positive for traces of explosive material, screening personnel from the Transportation Security Administration attempted to perform a full-body pat-down. Citing medical reasons, Petitioner repeatedly refused to be patted down and was subsequently escorted away from the checkpoint by law enforcement.   The agency assessed Petitioner a civil penalty for “interfer[ing] with screening personnel in the performance of their screening duties[.]” 49 C.F.R. Section 1540.109. Petitioner petitioned the DC Circuit to overturn the penalty on the ground that his refusal to submit to a pat-down, particularly in light of his medical justifications, did not constitute interference under the regulation. The court denied the petition finding that the agency lawfully applied its interference regulation to Petitioner’s conduct.   The court explained that it has recently defined the “ordinary meaning” of interfere as “to interpose in a way that hinders or impedes: comes into collision or be in opposition.” Here, in light of the established meaning, the TSA logically concluded that Petitioner’s conduct interfered with TSA personnel engaged in screening operations. TSA policy requires that whenever an individual triggers a positive explosives alarm, he or she must undergo a full-body pat-down. Petitioner’s repeated resistance to being patted down was “in opposition” to and “r[a]n at cross-purposes” with that policy.   Further, the court found that TSA’s conduct did not approach the level of egregiousness or outrageousness needed to establish a violation of substantive due process. View "Rohan Ramsingh v. TSA" on Justia Law

Federal Express Corporation—commonly known as FedEx—challenged the Department of Commerce’s authority to hold it strictly liable for aiding and abetting violations of the 2018 Export Controls Act.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of FedEx’s complaint, holding that Commerce’s regulation, 15 C.F.R. Section 764.2(b), and its strict-liability interpretation of it are not ultra vires. The court concluded that the statutory text, circuit precedent, and deference to the Executive Branch in matters of national security and foreign affairs all support Commerce’s interpretation.   The court explained that the first barrier to FedEx’s ultra vires challenge is that Commerce’s interpretation of its regulation to allow for strict liability in civil enforcement actions does not contravene any clear statutory command. Next, FedEx’s ultra vires argument runs into a second headwind—relevant circuit precedent. The court wrote that given that the DC circuit has already specifically held that Commerce can attach strict liability to the first term in the string of verbs “cause or aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, procure, permit, or approve[,]” 15 C.F.R. Section 764.2(b), there is no basis for the court to hold that Commerce acted ultra vires in attaching that same strict-liability reach to the next two verbs. Further, since FedEx has not shown that its asserted mens rea requirement for aiding and abetting liability was truly settled in the common law at the time the statute was promulgated, or that its common-law meaning fits within this specialized national-security scheme, FedEx’s argument does not come close to satisfying the strict standard for an ultra vires claim. View "Federal Express Corporation v. U.S. Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss this complaint alleging, among other things, an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs or for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, holding that dismissal was warranted.While he was incarcerated in federal prison and suffering from Hepatitis C, Plaintiff applied to receive treatment with Harvoni. Dr. Jeffrey Allen, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Medical Director, denied the request under BOP's then-operative protocol. Pursuant to later-revised protocol, Plaintiff received treatment, and his Hepatitis C was cured. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendant inflicted cruel and unusual punishment upon him by failing to grant his initial treatment request. The district court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that qualified immunity protected Defendant from Plaintiff's claims. View "Bernier v. Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Manuel Reynoso was convicted by jury on a gun-possession charge and two drug charges. On appeal, Reynoso challenged his convictions on several grounds. On the same day the district court sentenced Reynoso, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), which established that the felon-in-possession statute required the government to show not only that the defendant knew he possessed a gun but also that he knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year of imprisonment. Reynoso contended on appeal that his felon-in-possession conviction had to be overturned due to the government’s failure to make the additional showing Rehaif required. Because Reynoso did not raise that argument in the district court, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviewed his claim for only plain error. After the appellate court heard oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court granted review in another case to consider whether a person might be entitled to plain-error relief on appeal in a case involving a Rehaif error, Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021). Greer held that Rehaif errors at trial normally will not qualify as plain errors of a kind warranting relief in appeals from felon-in-possession convictions. In accordance with Greer, the Court of Appeal concluded the district court’s Rehaif error in this case did not amount to plain error. The Court also rejected Reynoso’s other challenges to his convictions, thus affirming the district court. View "United States v. Reynoso" on Justia Law

Appellate was sentenced to life in prison in 1979 when he escaped prison and killed a federal officer. After serving more than 40 years of his sentence, he sought parole relief but was denied by the U.S. Parole Commission ("the Commission"). The Commission reasoned that Appellant was a high risk.Appellant sued the Commission, claiming that the Commission violated his due process rights and exceeded its statutory discretion when it denied him parole in 2016. Reaching the merits of Appellant's petition, the district court denied relief. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of Appellant's petition, finding that the district court's jurisdictional analysis was proper and that the Commission did not violate Appellant's rights. View "Artie Dufur v. USPC" on Justia Law

The LA Times appeals the district court's denial of its motions to unseal court records relating to a search warrant allegedly executed on Senator Richard Burr in connection with an insider-trading investigation and the government's memorandum opposing its motion to unseal.The DC Circuit remanded the case to the district court to reconsider its common law analysis in light of new disclosures from a related investigation by the SEC and Senator Burr's public acknowledgment of the Justice Department's investigation, as well as precedent governing how the common law right should be balanced against competing interests. The district court shall reconsider the L.A. Times' challenge that it was fundamentally disadvantaged by the district court's decision to seal the government's opposition memorandum and attached exhibits. View "Los Angeles Times Communications LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In a public-health emergency, 42 U.S.C. 265 authorizes the Executive Branch to "prohibit, in whole or in part, the introduction of persons and property from such countries or places as he shall designate." The Executive exercised that power during the COVID-19 pandemic, issuing a series of orders prohibiting "covered aliens" from entering the United States by land from Mexico or Canada.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction in part, finding that it is likely that aliens covered by a valid section 265 order have no right to be in the United States and concluding that the Executive may expel plaintiffs under section 265, but only to places where they will not be persecuted or tortured. The court addressed plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits and rejected their arguments that section 265 covers only transportation providers such as common carriers; that the Executive has no power to expel aliens for violating a valid section 265 order; and that they are entitled to apply for asylum. However, the court concluded that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their narrow argument that under section 1231 the Executive cannot expel them to places where they face persecution or torture. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the equities require a preliminary injunction to stop the Executive from expelling plaintiffs to places where they will be persecuted or tortured. The court remanded for further proceedings and ultimate resolution of the merits, including plaintiffs' claim that the section 265 order is arbitrary and capricious. View "Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

The FCC promulgated a regulation which originally authorized the installation on private property, with the owner's consent, of "over-the-air reception devices," regardless of State and local restrictions, "including zoning, land-use, or building regulation[s], or any private covenant, homeowners' association rule or similar restriction on property." The FCC later expanded coverage to include antennas that act as "hub sites" or relay service to other locations. Petitioners, expressing concern about possible health effects from increased radiofrequency exposure, argued that the proliferation of commercial-grade antennas would increase the suffering of those with radiofrequency sensitivity—violating their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and the U.S. Constitution's protections of private property and personal autonomy. Petitioners also contend that the amendments would deny affected individuals fair notice and an opportunity to be heard.The DC Circuit first concluded that two of the petitioners' interests are impacted directly by the FCC's order and that CHD has associational standing. The court also concluded that the Commission's citation of and reliance on the Commission's Continental Airlines decision provided sufficient explanation for its authority to expand the regulation to hub-and-relay antennas carrying broadband Internet. The court rejected petitioners' contentions to the contrary that the order is unsupported by Section 303 of the Communications Act. Finally, the court rejected petitioners' contention that the order lacks a reasoned foundation because the Commission disregarded the human health consequences of its action. Rather, the court concluded that the Commission sufficiently explained that its order does not change the applicability of the Commission's radio frequency exposure requirements and that such concerns were more appropriately directed at its radiofrequency rulemaking. Furthermore, the Commission may also preempt restrictions on the placement of the new category of antennas now included in the regulation. Therefore, the court denied the petition challenging the FCC's order. View "Children's Health Defense v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Appellants, two individuals who have traveled on Amtrak in connection with their work and expect to continue doing so, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Amtrak from imposing an arbitration requirement on rail passengers and purchasers of rail tickets.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint because appellants have not plausibly alleged an actual injury-in-fact and therefore lack Article III standing. In this case, appellants have alleged neither ongoing nor imminent future injury. Rather, appellants assert only one cognizable interest, the interest in purchasing tickets to travel by rail, but Amtrak's new term of service has not meaningfully abridged that interest. View "Weissman v. National Railroad Passenger Corp." on Justia Law