Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Tyrell Gaston was on probation following a deferred judgment for a robbery that resulted in a gunfight, leaving him injured and his cousin dead. Shortly after, he was involved in two more violent incidents involving firearms, leading to charges of attempted murder and other offenses. Despite these charges being dismissed, Gaston continued to violate probation terms, including being out past curfew. During his arrest for these violations, a probation officer found keys to his truck and, upon questioning, Gaston mentioned a backpack in the truck, which led to a search revealing a loaded gun.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied Gaston's motion to suppress the evidence found in the truck, concluding that the search was supported by reasonable suspicion. Gaston had consented to searches as part of his probation agreement, which allowed searches based on reasonable grounds. The district court found that the probation officer had reasonable suspicion to search the truck based on Gaston's history and his reaction to the questioning about the backpack.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the search was justified under the Fourth Amendment's reasonable suspicion standard. The court noted that Gaston's history of violent conduct and his immediate disclaimer of the backpack provided a particularized and objective basis for the search. The court also upheld the district court's credibility determination that the probation officer's decision to search was based on Gaston's suspicious response. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Gaston" on Justia Law

The case involves three plaintiffs: Rockne Miller, a former Missouri legislator; John LaVanchy, a committee-records specialist currently working for the General Assembly; and Presidio Environmental, LLC, a company that sought to hire Miller as a lobbyist. They challenged a recent amendment to the Missouri Constitution that imposes a two-year ban on lobbying for former legislators and staff. Miller and LaVanchy argued that the ban prevented them from becoming lobbyists, while Presidio claimed it hindered their ability to hire Miller for lobbying purposes.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the Missouri Ethics Commission, upholding the lobbying ban. The court found that the ban was consistent with the First Amendment because it was narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the lobbying ban burdens political speech and thus must be subjected to strict scrutiny. The court found that Missouri failed to provide sufficient evidence of actual corruption or the appearance of corruption that the ban purportedly aimed to prevent. The court also concluded that the ban was not narrowly tailored, as it was both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, regulating too broadly and not addressing the specific issue of corruption effectively.The Eighth Circuit held that the two-year lobbying ban, as applied to the plaintiffs, violated the First Amendment. The court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Miller v. Ziegler" on Justia Law

In 2020, a student organization at the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, along with two students, sued the University for alleged First and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The case centered on the University's allocation of lounge space in the Coffman Memorial Union to certain student organizations, particularly nine cultural centers. The plaintiffs argued that this allocation constituted viewpoint discrimination and gave unbridled discretion to University officials.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed three of the five claims and later granted summary judgment in favor of the University on the remaining claims. The court found no evidence of viewpoint discrimination and deemed the unbridled discretion doctrine inapplicable to the University's past allocation decision. The plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment on one claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court agreed that the lounge space was a limited public forum and found that the University's allocation process was viewpoint neutral and reasonable. The court noted that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of viewpoint discrimination and that the University's decision was based on status-based distinctions, not viewpoint-based ones. The court also upheld the district court's finding that the unbridled discretion doctrine did not apply, as the challenge was to a past decision rather than an ongoing policy.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment, concluding that the University's allocation of lounge space did not violate the First Amendment. View "Viewpoint Neutrality Now! v. Regents of the University of Minnesota" on Justia Law

On December 26, 2019, Officers Rozeboom and Malone responded to a shoplifting report at Dick’s Sporting Goods in Papillion, Nebraska. The suspects were described as a black male and black female in a silver four-door sedan. Malone spotted a similar vehicle and conducted a traffic stop. Storrs, a black male, was driving, and Smith, a white female, was the passenger. Despite the discrepancy in the suspect description, the officers detained Storrs and Smith. During the encounter, Storrs and Smith were uncooperative, leading to their arrest and a search of their vehicle, which allegedly smelled of marijuana.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, finding they were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims. The court determined that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and probable cause for the continued detention and search based on the alleged odor of marijuana. The court also found no evidence of excessive force or First Amendment retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision in part, agreeing that the officers had probable cause to arrest Storrs and Smith for obstructing a peace officer and that there was no evidence of excessive force or First Amendment retaliation. However, the court reversed the summary judgment on the claim of unlawful continued detention, finding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion once they saw Smith was white. The court also found a genuine dispute of fact regarding the alleged odor of marijuana, precluding summary judgment on the illegal search claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Storrs v. Rozeboom" on Justia Law

Three gun rights organizations and their members challenged Minnesota’s permit-to-carry statute, which requires applicants to be at least 21 years old, arguing it violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that the Second Amendment’s plain text covered their conduct and that the government failed to show that restricting 18 to 20-year-olds’ right to bear handguns in public was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Minnesota appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the age restriction facially unconstitutional for otherwise qualified 18 to 20-year-olds and enjoining its enforcement. The district court applied the two-part test from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, focusing on the Second Amendment’s text and historical tradition. The court found that the plain text covered the plaintiffs’ conduct and that the government did not meet its burden to demonstrate a historical tradition of similar firearm regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that ordinary, law-abiding 18 to 20-year-olds are part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. The court found that Minnesota failed to provide sufficient historical analogues to justify the age restriction, noting that the state’s proffered evidence did not meet the burden of demonstrating a historical tradition of similar firearm regulations. Consequently, the court ruled that the age restriction in Minnesota’s permit-to-carry statute is unconstitutional. View "Worth v. Jacobson" on Justia Law

Mani Panoam Deng was charged with being an unlawful drug user in possession of a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Deng moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violated the Second Amendment and was void for vagueness. He pleaded guilty unconditionally, but appealed, renewing his constitutional challenges and arguing that the court erred by deferring a complete decision on his motion to dismiss.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied Deng's facial Second Amendment challenge and deferred ruling on his other claims, as they were tied to facts about his offense conduct that a jury needed to find. After Deng pleaded guilty, he appealed, renewing his constitutional challenges and arguing that the court erred by deferring a complete decision on his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that § 922(g)(3) is facially constitutional, citing a previous decision in United States v. Veasley. Deng's as-applied challenge was deemed waived due to his unconditional guilty plea. The court also rejected Deng's vagueness challenge, stating that a criminal statute is void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause only if it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes or is so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement. The court found that § 922(g)(3) was not vague as applied to Deng's conduct. Deng's argument that the district court erred by deferring a ruling on his vagueness and as-applied Second Amendment challenges was also dismissed as he had waived this claim by pleading guilty. View "United States v. Deng" on Justia Law

Michael Hoeft was found guilty by a jury of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm as a prohibited person. The case began when police officers responded to a call from a storage facility manager who reported an unauthorized individual asleep in a truck. Upon arrival, the officers found Hoeft asleep in the truck with a loaded crossbow on the passenger seat. After Hoeft refused to exit the vehicle, the officers tased and arrested him. A subsequent search of Hoeft and his truck revealed methamphetamine, syringes, a scale, a handgun, and the crossbow.Hoeft challenged the district court's decisions on four grounds. He argued that the evidence found by the police should have been suppressed as it was the result of an unconstitutional seizure. He also contended that the gun charge should have been dismissed from the indictment as the relevant statutes were unconstitutional. Hoeft further claimed that there was insufficient evidence to prove his intent to distribute the methamphetamine, and that an out-of-court statement he made to a chemical dependency counselor should have been admitted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The court found that the police officers had reasonable suspicion to investigate Hoeft, making the seizure reasonable. The court also upheld the constitutionality of the statutes under which Hoeft was charged. Regarding the drug charge, the court determined that a reasonable jury could infer intent to distribute based on the evidence presented. Finally, the court concluded that the exclusion of Hoeft's out-of-court statement was harmless, as it would not have introduced new evidence. View "United States v. Hoeft" on Justia Law

A group of Arkansas landowners sued Lawrence County, alleging that a bridge constructed by the county had caused their farms to flood, constituting an unlawful taking of their properties without just compensation, in violation of the U.S. and Arkansas Constitutions. The landowners claimed that the bridge acted as a dam, forcing excessive water into the Cache River, which then spilled onto their farms. They presented expert testimony to support their claims and sought damages based on the fair rental value of their properties during the period of the alleged taking.The district court upheld a jury award of nearly $350,000 to the landowners but rejected their request for an order to tear down the bridge. The county appealed the damages award, arguing that the landowners had failed to offer sufficient evidence of damages since they did not calculate the value of crops actually lost. The landowners cross-appealed the denial of their request for injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the damages award, holding that the evidence permitted the jury to make a fair and reasonable approximation of damages. The court found that the landowners were not obliged to prove damages by providing evidence of the amount of crops they expected to grow versus the amount of crops they actually grew due to increased flooding. Instead, they were entitled to recover the fair rental value of the property during the period of the taking.However, the court vacated the district court's order denying injunctive relief and remanded for the court to give the landowners' request a more focused consideration. The court found that the district court had relied heavily on the law of standing, which was not at issue, and had ventured into areas that had little bearing on a proper evaluation of the request for injunctive relief. View "Watkins v. Lawrence County, Arkansas" on Justia Law

Cory Sessler, a religious preacher, and his group were preaching loudly at a commercial festival in Davenport, Iowa. The festival was held in a fenced-off area of the city's downtown streets and sidewalks, which were typically considered a "traditional public forum". However, during the festival, pedestrian access was controlled and vendors had rented spaces to sell goods. Sessler and his group, who were not paying vendors, were asked by police officers to relocate outside the fences due to complaints from nearby vendors. Sessler later sued the officers and the city, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights.The district court denied Sessler's request for a preliminary injunction, a decision which was affirmed by the appellate court. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the officers did not violate Sessler's rights and that they were protected by qualified immunity. The court also granted summary judgment to the city on the official-policy claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed that qualified immunity applied to the claims against the officers. The court found that it was unclear whether the fenced-off city streets and sidewalks remained a "traditional public forum" or served as a less-protected "limited public forum" during the festival. The court also found that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the officers' actions were anything but content neutral or that such actions were unreasonable. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Sessler v. City of Davenport, Iowa" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a case involving a group of plaintiffs who owned properties near proposed wind turbine sites in Page County, Iowa. The plaintiffs sued the county, its board of supervisors, and county officials after the board issued a commercial wind energy permit to Shenandoah Hills Wind Project, LLC (SHW). The plaintiffs claimed that the issuance of the permit violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Iowa Constitution, Iowa Code, and county ordinances. They also claimed that county officials violated the Iowa Open Meetings Act by holding nonpublic meetings on SHW's application. The defendants removed the case to federal court based on the federal due process claim.The district court dismissed the federal due process claim for lack of prudential standing and as implausibly pleaded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It also dismissed the state claims as time-barred under Iowa law and implausibly pleaded under Rule 12(b)(6). After the district court's decision, the county revoked the permit. Despite the revocation, the plaintiffs appealed the district court's order.The Court of Appeals held that the county's revocation of SHW's permit mooted the plaintiffs' claims, except for their claims under the Iowa Open Meetings Act. The court affirmed the district court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining claims and its dismissal of them. The court vacated the remainder of the district court's order and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the non-Open Meetings claims as moot. View "Hunter v. Page County, Iowa" on Justia Law