Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant has two state convictions for indecent exposure to children. The government contends that those convictions “clearly” relate United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit “to the sexual exploitation of children,” so Defendant should be subject to the enhancement. Defendant countered that “sexual exploitation of children,” in this context, applies only to offenses relating to child pornography, so his sentence is not subject to the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(e)’s use of the phrase “relating to the sexual exploitation of children” refers to any criminal sexual conduct involving children. Defendant’s convictions for indecent exposure to a child neatly fall within that broad category. View "USA v. Moore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Nueces County and Wellpath for “County/Municipal Liability” under Section 1983. Specifically, he alleged that the county was liable because it “sanctioned the custom, practice, and/or policy or procedure of failing to protect and/or ignoring the serious medical needs of those entrusted to [its] care.” The original claim was not specific about how Wellpath was supposedly liable. The county and Wellpath moved to dismiss. The district court granted both motions but permitted Martinez to file a “Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint.” Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim against Nueces County and the denial of leave to amend as to Wellpath.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that because Plaintiff had not properly alleged a custom or policy that was the moving force of his injuries, the district court was correct to dismiss his claims against Nueces County. Further, the court found that from the face of Plaintiff’s pleadings, there is no reason to conclude that Wellpath, at an organization-wide level, had a policy of deliberate indifference that was the moving force of Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violation at the Nueces County Jail. This is doubly so because of Plaintiff’s failure to allege, with sufficient detail, what happened to him at the jail. View "Martinez v. Nueces County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Austin Independent School District (“AISD”) on behalf of her minor son, A.H., alleging that AISD violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983by employing an individual assigned to help A.H. accommodate his disabilities, but who instead verbally harassed him and threw a trash can at him, hitting him and causing injury. After the incident, the parties settled all of A.H.’s Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) claims outside of court but agreed that Plaintiff still had the right to file a separate action containing A.H.’s claims arising under Section 504, the ADA, and Section 1983. Heston then brought these claims in a suit filed in 2018. The district court dismissed the suit without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (“IDEA”) administrative remedies.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded it to the district court for further consideration in light of Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 143 S. Ct. 859 (2023). Since Plaintiff appealed and the Parties’ briefed the case, the Supreme Court decided Luna Perez, concluding that the IDEA does not require administrative exhaustion “where a plaintiff brings a suit under another federal law for compensatory damages.” This constitutes a “modification in controlling legal principles . . . rendering a previous determination inconsistent with the prevailing doctrine.” View "Heston v. Austin Indep" on Justia Law

Defendants were among 24 individuals indicted on various charges in connection with their involvement in the Sinaloa Cartel. Defendants were jointly tried during a 10-day jury trial. One defendant was convicted on five counts, while another was convicted on 12 counts. Each received concurrent life sentences for all counts on which they were convicted. Defendants raised various challenges to their respective convictions and sentences on appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions, vacated the sentences that exceed their respective statutory maxima and remanded the case for resentencing on those counts only. The court explained that the maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for either Count IV—Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments or Count V— Conspiracy to Possess Firearms in Furtherance of any Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking Crime is 20 years. 18 U.S.C. Sections1956(a)(2), 924o. The maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for Counts VI, VIII, or X—all VICAR convictions—is 10 years. Nevertheless, both Defendants were sentenced to concurrent life terms of imprisonment on Counts IV and V, and one defendant also received concurrent life sentences for Counts VI, VIII, and X. These sentences all exceed their respective statutory maxima. Therefore, the life sentences imposed for Counts IV, V, VI, VIII, and X are vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing on those counts only. View "USA v. Urquidi" on Justia Law

This litigation challenges the bail practices of one Louisiana parish. The claim is that money bail is required for pretrial detainees without consideration of alternatives, violating the rights of indigents to substantive due process and equal protection. The district court denied all relief.   The Fifth Circuit held that abstention is mandated and remanded in order that the district court may dismiss the suit. The court explained that Texas courts are neither unable nor unwilling to reconsider bail determinations under the proper circumstances, thus providing state court detainees the chance to raise federal claims without the need to come to federal court. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to show that Louisiana is unable or unwilling to reconsider bail determinations. How quickly those can be reconsidered is irrelevant because “arguments about delay and timeliness pertain not to the adequacy of a state proceeding, but rather to ‘conventional claims of bad faith.’” View "Little v. Doguet" on Justia Law

Two Texas employers: Braidwood Management, Inc. (“Braidwood”) and Bear Creek Bible Church (“Bear Creek”), filed suit, as per their closely held religious beliefs, asserting that Title VII, as interpreted in the EEOC’s guidance and Bostock, prevents them from operating their places of employment in a way compatible with their Christian beliefs. Plaintiffs have implicitly asserted that they will not alter or discontinue their employment practices. all parties admitted in district court that numerous policies promulgated by plaintiffs (such as those about dress codes and segregating bathroom usage by solely biological sex) already clearly violate EEOC guidance. Both plaintiffs also contend that they are focused on individuals’ behavior, not their asserted identity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable; reversed the class certifications; affirmed the judgment against Bear Creek; affirmed the ruling that Braidwood is statutorily entitled to a Title VII exemption; vacated the judgment that Braidwood is constitutionally entitled to a Title VII exemption; and vacated the judgment regarding the scope-of-Title-VII claims as a matter of law. The court reasoned that under the facts presented, it cannot determine a more appropriate, limited class definition for any of the classes presented here. Accordingly, the court held that both Braidwood and Bear Creek have standing and bring individual claims. Further, the court explained that the EEOC failed to show a compelling interest in denying Braidwood, individually, an exemption. The agency does not even attempt to argue the point outside of gesturing to a generalized interest in prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination in every potential case. View "Braidwood Management v. EEOC" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted Petitioner a partial certificate of appealability (“COA”) after the district court dismissed his federal habeas corpus petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). In his state habeas proceedings, Petitioner procedurally defaulted on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He contends that the default stemmed from ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel and should therefore be excused.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that Petitioner had not shown that habeas counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, he has not shown cause for the default. The court explained that it is true that the opinion of a court-appointed psychiatrist does not always exonerate counsel of any duty to investigate further. But considering all the circumstances, Petitioner’s habeas attorneys did not have a duty to investigate more than they did. Further, Petitioner’s counsel, in stark contrast, did investigate by requesting a medical evaluation. And, again, his attorneys were not mounting a defense at trial but instead were determining whether they could acquiesce to Petitioner’s desire to waive habeas relief and dismiss them. View "Mullis v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment convicting and sentencing Defendant on six charges involving child pornography. The court held that no reasonable suspicion is necessary to conduct the sort of routine manual cell phone search at the border that occurred here.Defendant and two others crossed the international bridge to Presidio, Texas, in a recreational vehicle (RV) that was towing a passenger car behind it. Upon reaching the port of entry into the United States, the RV was sent to secondary inspection. Defendant was placed in a holding cell. He admitted to owning the contraband. He also provided the passcode to unlock his cell phone to a Homeland Security Investigations special agent. The agent manually scrolled through various apps. As a result, he found what he believed to be child pornography in the photo section of Defendant’s phone. Defendant was indicted on six charges involving child pornography. He subsequently moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his devices. After a hearing, the district court refused to suppress the child pornography. Defendant was found guilty on all six counts and sentenced to 720 months imprisonment and a life term of supervised release. He filed a timely notice of appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the border search exception is a “longstanding, historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general principle that a warrant be obtained” for a search. Courts have allowed a variety of border searches without requiring either a warrant or reasonable suspicion. The extent of the privacy intrusion, however, will depend on the methodology employed by the government agent. The court held that no reasonable suspicion is necessary to conduct the sort of routine manual cell phone search at the border that occurred here. View "USA v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that government agents searched his cell phone at the border without a warrant on at least five occasions and that agents copied data from his cell phone at least once. Plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the respective heads of each entity in their official capacity (collectively, the government), challenging the searches, as well as ICE and CBP policies regarding border searches of electronic devices. In the district court, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking, among other relief, a preliminary injunction preventing the government from searching his cell phone at the border without a warrant. The district court denied the preliminary injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial threat he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. The court reasoned that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the ICE and CBP policies authorize warrantless searches. Further, the allegations in Plaintiff’s verified complaint are evidence of a pattern of warrantless searches of Plaintiff’s cell phone. However, Plaintiff has no additional evidence to establish that he will be stopped by border agents in the future and that the agents will search his cell phone without a warrant. View "Anibowei v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Texas and Missouri filed suit seeking to compel DHS to employ the $2.75 billion Congress allocated “for the construction of [a] barrier system along the southwest border” before those funds expire. The district court dismissed Texas for “claim splitting,” held that Missouri did not have standing to sue, and denied the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. The states appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to "expeditiously consider the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction." The court explained Texas should not have been dismissed for claim splitting because Texas’s Article III standing confers federal jurisdiction. In terms of causation, Texas needs only to have alleged facts showing the Federal Defendants’ conduct is a cause-in-fact of the injury that the State asserts. Here, Texas claimed that border barriers (i) reduce illegal entries in areas where constructed, and (ii) increase the rate at which illegal aliens are detected and apprehended.However, the court declined to order the states' requested remedy, instead remanding the case to the district court. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law