Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

During the pendency of his appeal of a postjudgment order denying defendant Rafael Servin compassionate release from prison, he died. The appellate proceedings were therefore abated. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal filed this opinion to make two points: (1) the statutory requirements and the standard of appellate review explained in Martinez v. Board of Parole Hearings, 183 Cal.App.4th 578 (2010) applied in all cases under Penal Code section 1170(e), whether the defendant or the State appeals; and (2) to alert the Attorney General and the criminal defense bar to the necessity of immediately advising the appellate court of the time exigency and the need for calendar preference in compassionate release cases. View "California v. Servin" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that recording secret business conversations and using the recordings in an arbitration were not in connection with a judicial or official proceeding authorized by law, and therefore they were not protected activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute).In this case, after defendant, the president of Tang Energy Corp., secretly recorded conversations with Sherman Xuming Zhang, president of AVIC International USA, defendant introduced the recordings as evidence in contractual arbitration. When the arbitrators decided the issue in favor of Tang Energy, Zhang and AVIC filed suit against defendant for invasion of privacy and eavesdropping on or recording confidential communications in violation of Penal Code sections 632 and 637.2. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's special motion to strike under section 425.16. View "Zhang v. Jenevein" on Justia Law

Frederick Theodore Rall III, a political cartoonist and blogger, filed suit against the Los Angeles Times after it published a "note to readers" and a later more detailed report questioning the accuracy of a blog post plaintiff wrote for The Times. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motions to strike the complaint.The court held that The Times' articles were published in a public forum and concerned issues of public interest, and thus the written statements were protected free speech activity. Furthermore, the articles were absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d), because they were a fair and true report of an LAPD investigation that was central to the substance of the articles. Therefore, plaintiff failed to produce evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing on his defamation claims. In regard to plaintiff's wrongful termination claims, the court held that plaintiff's employment claims arose directly from The Times's protected First Amendment conduct: deciding not to publish plaintiff's work. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of his employment claims. View "Rall v. Tribune 365 LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Davonte Stinson and codefendant Dontae McFadden approached S.A. in his parked car and, at gunpoint, took several items from him including his wallet, keys, and cell phone. Still at gunpoint, they made S.A. move from the driver’s seat to the trunk, placed him in the trunk and closed it, and then continued to look through the car. Defendant and codefendant then fled, leaving S.A. in the trunk. Shortly thereafter, using S.A.’s keys, defendant and codefendant entered the apartment S.A. shared with his fiancé, A.L.G., and her two children. At gunpoint, they demanded that A.L.G. give them whatever guns and money that were in the apartment. After obtaining two guns and other items, they left. Defendant and codefendant were tried together. The jury found defendant guilty of kidnapping to commit robbery, robbery in the second degree, possession of a firearm by a felon, and robbery in the first degree. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defense motion to sever count six (felon in possession of a firearm alleged against codefendant), charging only codefendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm based on the discovery of a handgun in codefendant’s backpack approximately three months after the robberies of S.A. and A.L.G; (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction of kidnapping to commit robbery because it failed to establish that the movement of S.A. from the driver’s seat to the trunk of his car was more than incidental to the commission of the robbery and that it increased the risk of harm to S.A.; and (3) the court erred in the manner in which it modified CALCRIM No. 1203. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in instructing the jury with the modified version of CALCRIM No. 1203. In the unpublished portions of this opinion, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defense motion to sever; nor were defendant’s due process and fair trial rights violated by the joinder. Furthermore, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction of kidnapping to commit robbery. However, finding merit to the contentions raised by defendant in his supplemental briefing, the Court remanded this case back to the trial court for a Franklin hearing and for the trial court to exercise its discretion under Penal section 12022.53 (h), to consider whether to strike the section 12022.53 (b), enhancement. Otherwise, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Stinson" on Justia Law

In 2006, police arrested defendant Daniel Marquez in Ventura County on a drug possession offense. Without his consent, authorities collected Marquez’s DNA sample and entered his DNA profile into a statewide database. Marquez was never charged with the drug offense. In 2008, investigators retrieved DNA evidence from an Orange County robbery, and that evidence matched Marquez’s DNA profile in the database. Police contacted Marquez, and with his consent they collected a second DNA sample, which matched the DNA evidence from the robbery. The State filed two robbery counts and a related offense. The trial court denied Marquez’s motion to suppress the DNA evidence, and a jury convicted him of the charged offenses. The court sentenced Marquez to 25 years to life in state prison, plus an additional 15 years for three alleged prior serious felony convictions. The Court of Appeal held that the 2006 collection of Marquez’s DNA sample was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment; the prosecution failed to prove that Marquez was validly arrested or that his DNA was collected as part of a routine booking procedure. However, the trial court properly admitted the 2008 DNA evidence under a well-established exception to the exclusionary rule: the attenuation doctrine. Additionally, due to a recent statutory change, the Court remanded for the trial court to consider striking the additional punishment for Marquez’s three prior serious felony convictions. The Court also ordered the trial court to modify Marquez’s custody credits. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Marquez" on Justia Law

Defendant Andy Hem fatally shot his brother, victim Sokorng “Sok” Hem in 2014. The State argued the shooting was first degree murder; defendant claimed self-defense. The jury found defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner, finding he personally used a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to prison for 16 years. On appeal defendant contended the prosecutor misstated the law in closing argument, the court improperly excluded evidence, the court failed to conduct an adequate (or any) inquiry into a claim of jury misconduct, and he was entitled to a sentencing remand under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2018, which gave trial courts new discretion to strike certain enhancements. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court did not adequately address jury misconduct, which as a matter of law, raised a presumption of prejudice. "The jury deliberations were difficult, as reflected by pointed written questions submitted by the jury, a reported deadlock, and what seems to have been a compromise verdict. In these circumstances, we cannot find that the presumption of prejudice was dispelled by the record and we must reverse the judgment." View "California v. Hem" on Justia Law

Loren Prout filed an inverse condemnation action alleging Department of Transportation (Caltrans) violated the Fifth Amendment in 2010 by physically occupying without compensation a long, narrow strip of Prout’s land fronting California Highway 12, to make highway improvements. The land taken was a 1.31-acre strip, 20 feet wide and about 6,095 feet long. Caltrans cross-complained for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and specific performance, alleging Prout agreed to dedicate the strip by deed for highway purposes 20 years earlier when he obtained an encroachment permit for a subdivision he was developing. Prout’s subdivision map stated the strip of land fronting Highway 12, shown by hash marks on the map, was “IN THE PROCESS OF BEING DEEDED TO CALTRANS FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES.” No deed was ever signed or recorded. After a bench trial on the bifurcated issue of liability, the trial court found Caltrans validly accepted the offer of dedication by physically occupying the strip for its highway improvements, and the court awarded specific performance on Caltrans’s cross-complaint and ordered Prout to execute a deed. On appeal, Prout claims the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he agreed to dedicate the entire strip of land, as opposed to just a small area needed to connect the subdivision’s private road to the state highway. The Court of Appeal concluded Prout’s challenge was barred by his failure to file a timely petition for writ of mandamus, and his inverse condemnation claim failed because substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Prout made an offer to dedicate the entire strip of land in 1990 and did not revoke the offer before Caltrans accepted it by physically using the strip to make highway improvements in 2010-2011. View "Prout v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Chaz Nasjhee Pride was convicted by jury of robbery, which found true allegations he committed the robbery for the benefit of, or at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang. In a bifurcated proceeding, Pride admitted two prior prison offenses and the court found true allegations Pride previously committed a strike offense and a serious felony prior. The court sentenced Pride to 21 years in prison based upon six years for the robbery (double the midterm of three years) plus 10 years for the gang enhancement and five years for the serious felony prior. The court struck one of the prison prior allegations and stayed punishment on the second prison prior because it arose from the same conduct that resulted in the serious felony prior. On appeal, Pride contended his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act were violated when a police detective viewed and saved a copy of a video Pride posted on a social media account shortly after the robbery depicting Pride wearing a chain taken in the robbery. The Court of Appeal concluded there was no violation of Pride's rights. In supplemental briefing, however, the State conceded the matter should have been remanded for the court to consider whether to exercise its newly conferred discretion to strike the five-year serious felony enhancement pursuant to recently enacted amendments to California Penal Code sections 667 and 1385. Accordingly, the matter was remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to consider whether to dismiss or strike the Penal Code section 667 (a) enhancement and, if so, to resentence Pride accordingly. In all other respects, the Court affirmed Pride's conviction. View "California v. Pride" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the City in an action alleging that the City engaged in a pattern and practice of illegally exempting certain development projects in Venice from permitting requirements in the Venice Land Use Plan (LUP) and in the California Coastal Act.The court held that the Venice Sign-Off (VSO) process was ministerial and did not trigger due process protections; the director of planning was not required to review VSO projects for compliance with the LUP; additions to existing structures were eligible for exemptions under the Coastal Act; and Venice Coalition was not entitled to injunctive relief. View "Venice Coalition to Preserve Unique Community Character v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

When a student accused of sexual misconduct faces severe disciplinary sanctions, and the credibility of witnesses (whether the accusing student, other witnesses, or both) is central to the adjudication of the allegation, fundamental fairness requires, at a minimum, that the university provide a mechanism by which the accused may cross–examine those witnesses, directly or indirectly, at a hearing in which the witnesses appear in person or by other means (such as means provided by technology like videoconferencing) before a neutral adjudicator with the power independently to find facts and make credibility assessments.A former USC undergraduate student appealed the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of administrative mandate seeking to set aside his expulsion. The Court of Appeal reversed and held that, although the student failed to meet his burden of proving that defendants were actually biased against him, USC's disciplinary procedure failed to provide the student with a fair hearing. In this case, USC's disciplinary review process failed to provide fundamental fairness protections after it expelled the student based on allegations of nonconsensual sexual misconduct. View "Doe v. Allee" on Justia Law