Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Minor A.R. (the Minor) challenged a dispositional order committing him to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (hereafter, DJJ). At the time of the disposition hearing, the Minor was 18 years old. His history with the juvenile justice system began when he was 13 years old, and a petition was first filed against him. In 2012, he admitted two counts of residential burglary. and was declared a ward. Since then, he would be charged with various property crimes, culminating with burglary, robbery and use of a deadly weapon. He admitted to several probation violations, leading to the commitment order at issue here. The Minor argued the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to DJJ, on the grounds there was no substantial evidence that a less restrictive placement would be inappropriate or ineffective. He also argued the court erred by applying his custody credits to the overall maximum term of confinement, instead of the lower maximum term set by the court. In a supplemental brief, Minor argued there was no substantial evidence of probable benefit from the DJJ commitment, citing a recently decided case, In re Carlos J., 22 Cal.App.5th 1 (2018). The Court of Appeal rejected these contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Nathan Bussey guilty of unauthorized taking or driving of a vehicle and receiving a stolen vehicle. Before trial, defendant had entered pleas of no contest to two misdemeanor counts of possession of drug paraphernalia and driving with a suspended license. Defendant admitted certain recidivist allegations, and the trial court sustained the remainder. It then sentenced him to state prison for six years (after striking two of the recidivist findings). On appeal, defendant claimed the trial court erroneously ignored his pretrial request to act in propria persona. He also contended that he received an unauthorized sentence, asserting that the trial court should have designated both of his felony convictions as misdemeanors and sentenced him accordingly, because the statutes on which these convictions are based should be deemed to be included within the reach of a 2014 ballot proposition that reduced a number of offenses to misdemeanors (even though they were not expressly included in it). The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The California Supreme Court granted review pending its disposition of “related issues” in other pending appeals. Then the Supreme Court decided California v. Page, 3 Cal.5th 1175 (2017), which concluded that a conviction for unlawfully taking a vehicle valued at less than $950 was eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18; unlawful driving, on the other hand, was not an eligible offense. It then transferred this matter back to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Page. Having done so, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the conviction for unlawful taking or driving, vacated the sentence, and remanded for retrial on the election of the State and resentencing. View "California v. Bussey" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant, Anthony Esparza Cortez, Jr., a convicted felon, and his friend, Michael Saavedra, conspired to commit murder against Rene Perez, and his son-in-law, Alvino Barrera. While defendant drove, Saavedra fired a gun at Perez and Barrera in another car. Defendant and Saavedra then drove to the home of Guadalupe Valle, Perez’s relative by marriage. Armed with a rifle and a handgun, defendant and Saavedra fired more than 30 bullets into the house, which was occupied by 10 people. Defendant admitted having possession of the rifle used in the shooting, and of an assault rifle which is banned in California, as well as several rounds of ammunition. A jury convicted defendant of five charges: conspiracy to commit murder; being a felon in possession of a firearm; possessing firearms ammunition while prohibited from possessing a firearm; assault with a firearm; and possessing an assault weapon. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate, determinate term of 29 years four months, followed by an indeterminate term of 25 years to life. On appeal, defendant claimed: (1) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury sua sponte on conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm and conspiracy to shoot at an inhabited dwelling as lesser included offenses of conspiracy to commit murder as charged; (2) the trial court erred in denying his requested self-defense instruction; (3) substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of conspiracy to commit murder; and (4) four sentencing errord, which the State conceded. The Court of Appeal remanded this matter to the trial court for the purpose of permitting the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether to strike defendant’s firearm enhancement, and to make the other corrections to defendant’s sentence. In all other regards, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Cortez" on Justia Law

The Templos filed a complaint with two causes of action for personal injury and property damage against Lu for damages resulting from a car accident. The third cause of action named the state as the sole defendant and sought a declaratory judgment that California Code of Civil Procedure, section 631, 1 which requires litigants to pay a $150 nonrefundable jury fee, is unconstitutional as an improper “tax” because it was “not enacted by a two-thirds vote of the California Legislature [as required by] . . . Article XIII A Section 3 of the California Constitution.” They alleged the fee “does not provide plaintiffs with any benefit or service and is not even applied to the actual jury fees incurred during the course of a trial. In addition, the [fee] does not reasonably reflect the cost incurred, if any, by the State . . . to provide jury services to the plaintiffs.” The Judicial Council, not the state, administers and manages the nonrefundable jury fees. The trial court dismissed and the court of appeal affirmed. The Judicial Council, not the state as a whole, has the “direct institutional interest” necessary to defend the action. View "Templo v. State of California" on Justia Law

Ernest Orozco pled guilty to one count of unlawfully driving a vehicle of another without permission, and one count of receiving a stolen vehicle. California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014, which among other things, established a procedure for specified classes of offenders to have their felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors and be resentenced accordingly. In a previously unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of Orozco's petition for resentencing under Proposition 47. In this opinion, at the direction of the California Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal reconsidered this matter in light of California v. Page, 3 Cal.5th 1175 (2017). The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order denying Orozco's petition without prejudice to consideration of a subsequent petition providing evidence of eligibility. View "California v. Orozco" on Justia Law

Defendant Nicholas John Smit filed a petition to reduce his felony possession of marijuana for sale conviction to a misdemeanor. The superior court found defendant ineligible for relief because he was convicted of four counts of attempted murder in this matter, in addition to the drug conviction. The Court of Appeal concluded a concurrent conviction for attempted murder in the same case in which the defendant was charged and convicted of possessing marijuana for sale does not render the defendant ineligible for resentencing on the marijuana count. The Court, therefore, reversed the superior court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Smit" on Justia Law

V.D., a worker at the Pittsburg Marina, saw G.B. with other young men near the maintenance yard, through a cyclone fence. He went inside a building where he could see them through an open door approximately 30 feet away. V.D. saw G.B., standing, while the others were sitting, dancing and waving a gun in the air. About five minutes later, police arrived, detained the young men, and discovered a shotgun and a revolver in the area where the young men had been. V.D. identified G.B. as the person who had been holding the gun. Officer Baker and V.D. both testified that G.B. was wearing white, but photographs of the individuals detained by police show him wearing black. G.B. was placed on juvenile probation after the court sustained allegations he possessed a concealable firearm (Penal Code section 29610). The court of appeal affirmed in part, rejecting an argument that the jurisdictional finding must be reversed because the eyewitness identification was unreliable. The court struck a probation condition requiring that G.B. “have peaceful contact only with all law enforcement” as unconstitutionally vague and narrowed a condition that G.B. stay away from any school campus unless enrolled to be consistent with state law concerning visiting school grounds. View "In re G.B." on Justia Law

Defendant and appellant, Reyna Killion, filed a motion to reduce her conviction for felony assault with a deadly weapon to a misdemeanor and for termination of her probation. The court granted defendant’s request to reduce her offense to a misdemeanor, but denied her request to terminate her probation. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in determining it did not have jurisdiction to terminate her probation, pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.097(a)(1). The Court of Appeal agreed: "Indeed, section 1203.097, a rather lengthy statute, deals only with the initial imposition of probation at sentencing for domestic violence offenders. Nowhere does it address any subsequent remedial provisions of which a defendant might avail herself to reduce the terms and/or length of probation. That subject is dealt with exclusively in section 1203.3. This suggests that the legislature intended to require an initial imposition of a 36-month term of probation in domestic violence cases, but did not intend to circumscribe the court’s discretion to later reduce that term pursuant to section 1203.3 upon a showing of good cause." View "California v. Killion" on Justia Law

Penal Code sections 3051 and 1170.1(c) are irreconcilable as they apply to a youth offender who commits an additional crime in prison after the age of 26, because section 3051, which specifically addresses youth offenders, dictates that the youth offender be immediately released upon being found suitable for parole. In contrast, section 1170.1(c) would require the same youth offender to serve any applicable Thompson term even after being found suitable for release. Because section 3051 is both later-enacted and more specific, section 3051 supersedes section 1170.1(c).The Court of Appeal granted a petition for writ of habeas corpus, ordering Ronald Jenson released. Jenson was convicted of first degree felony murder at age 19. Jenson committed three additional in-prison crimes during his first nine years of incarceration, but he has remained crime-free for the last 30 years of his sentence. The Board of Parole Hearings found Jenson suitable for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing, but the CDCR ordered him to serve an additional sentence for his in-prison offenses. The court held that Jenson need not serve his Thompson term and was entitled to be released from prison. View "In re Jenson" on Justia Law

Minor, age 15, fell asleep in class, admitted he smoked marijuana the night before, and acquiesced to being searched, volunteering that he had a knife. The assistant principal found a folding pocket knife with a three-inch blade, rolling papers, and lighters. The Napa County DA filed a wardship petition (Welfare and Institutions Code 602) alleging a misdemeanor. Minor admitted the offense. The matter was continued. Two weeks later, Minor was arrested for smoking marijuana. The court declared Minor a ward of the court, placed him on probation, to be served in his mother’s home, and prohibited knowingly using or possessing alcohol or controlled substances, with a testing requirement. A second petition alleged that Minor tested positive for, and admitted using, marijuana and tested positive for Xanax. Two months later, another petition alleged that Minor failed to attend school, used marijuana, was discharged from a treatment program for noncompliance, and admitted using alcohol. Minor admitted using marijuana and alcohol. Before the dispositional hearing, the probation officer reported Minor had tested negative for controlled substances, was doing well in school, and had begun working. The treatment program advised that Minor was “doing very well.” The court continued him as a ward with a new probation condition allowing searches of his electronic devices and requiring him to disclose necessary passwords. The court of appeal struck the electronics search condition as unconstitutionally overbroad. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law